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Burkean minimalism has long played an important role in constitutional
law. Like other judicial minimalists, Burkeans believe in rulings that are at
once narrow and theoretically unambitious; what Burkeans add is an in-
sistence on respect for traditional practices and an intense distrust of those
who would renovate social practices by reference to moral or political rea-
soning of their own. An understanding of the uses and limits of Burkean
minimalism helps to illuminate a number of current debates, including
those involving substantive due process, the Establishment Clause, and the
power of the president to protect national security. Burkean minimalists
oppose, and are opposed, by three groups: originalists, who want to re-
cover the original understanding of the Constitution; rationalist
minimalists, who favor small steps but who are often critical of traditions
and established practices; and perfectionists, both liberal and conserva-
tive, who want to read the Constitution in a way that fits with the most
attractive political ideals. The argument for Burkean minimalism is
strongest in domains in which three assumptions hold: originalism would
produce intolerable results; established traditions are generally just, adap-
tive to social needs, or at least acceptable; and the theory-building
capacities of the federal judiciary are sharply limited. Burkean minimalists
face a number of unresolved dilemmas, above all involving the appropri-
ately Burkean response to non-Burkean, or anti-Burkean, precedents.
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And first of all, the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intel-
lect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected
reason of the ages, combining the principles of original justice with the in-
finite variety of human concerns, as a heap of old exploded errors, would
no longer be studied. Personal self-sufficiency and arrogance (the certain
attendants upon all those who have never experienced a wisdom greater
than their own) would usurp the tribunal.
-Edmund Burke'
I tend to look at the cases from the bottom up rather than the top down....
In terms of the application of the law, you begin obviously with the prece-
dents before you.
-Chief Justice John Roberts2
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the impor-
tant question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they
are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident
and force.
-Alexander Hamilton3
If as in ordinary language, a preceding generation be called old, this old
or preceding generation could not have had as much experience as the
succeeding generation. . . . What then is the wisdom of the times called
old? Is it the wisdom of gray hairs? No. It is the wisdom of the cradle.
-Jeremy Bentham4
1. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND
BURKE 416, 456-57 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999).
2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 159 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief
Justice of the United States).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).





Consider the following cases:
1. For over fifty years, the words "under God" have been part of the
Pledge of Allegiance.5 Some parents object to the use of those words,
arguing that under current constitutional principles, the reference to
God must be counted as an establishment of religion.6
2. For over seventy years, the Supreme Court has permitted Congress to
create "independent" regulatory agencies-agencies whose heads are
immune from the plenary removal power of the president.7 The De-
partment of Justice now attacks the notion of "independence," arguing
that it is inconsistent with the system of checks and balances under any
reasonable understanding of that system.'
3. The president of the United States has long engaged in "foreign surveil-
lance" by wiretapping conversations in which at least one of the parties
is in another nation and is suspected of being unfriendly to the United
States.9 The practice of foreign surveillance has been upheld by several
lower courts, which see that practice as falling within the President's
"inherent" authority.' ° Those subject to such surveillance argue that as
originally understood, the Constitution is not easily construed to grant
such "inherent" authority to the President.
Each of these cases presents a conflict between long-standing practices
and what can be plausibly argued to be the best interpretation of the Consti-
tution. Those who challenge the practices contend that the best
interpretation must prevail. A predictable response is that when construing
5. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 7 (2004).
6. Id. at8.
7. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
8. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41.
9. In federal court, the authority to engage in such surveillance has been asserted for thirty-
five years. United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970). The practice of "national security
surveillance" has been traced to a decision of the Eisenhower administration in 1954. See Morgan
Cloud, The Bugs in Our System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A21. The Department of Justice sug-
gests a much longer legacy:
This Nation has a long tradition of wartime enemy surveillance-a tradition that can be traced
to George Washington, who made frequent and effective use of secret intelligence.... And for
as long as electronic communications have existed, the United States has intercepted those
communications during wartime, and done so, not surprisingly, without judicial warrants. In
the Civil War, for example, telegraph wiretapping was common and provided important intel-
ligence for both sides. In World War I, President Wilson authorized the military to intercept all
telegraph, telephone, and cable communications into and out of the United States .... So too
in World War II; the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt authorized the
interception of all communications traffic into and out of the United States.
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., Prepared Statement (Feb. 6, 2006), http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag-speech-60206.html.
10. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912-16 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Sealed Case, 310 F3d
717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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the Constitution, courts should be closely attentive to entrenched practices,
and must give deference to the judgments of public officials extending over
time. On this view, constitutional interpretation should be conservative in
the literal sense-respecting settled judicial doctrine, but also deferring to
traditions.
Those who make such arguments adopt an approach to constitutional
law that I shall call Burkean minimalism." Burkean minimalists believe that
constitutional principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, with
close reference to long-standing practices. Like all minimalists, Burkeans
insist on incrementalism; but they also emphasize the need for judges to pay
careful heed to established traditions" and to avoid independent moral and
political arguments of any kind. On this count, Burkean minimalists should
be distinguished from their rationalist counterparts, who are less focused on
long-standing practices and more willing to require an independent justifica-
tion for those practices." In the nation's history, Justices Felix Frankfurter
and Sandra Day O'Connor have been the most prominent practitioners of
Burkean minimalism, in the sense that they have tended to favor small steps
and close attention to both experience and tradition. As we shall see,
Burkean minimalism can be used in diverse ways; some judges freely per-
mit the democratic branches to reject traditions but are unwilling to overturn
traditions on their own, whereas other judges believe that when plausibly
challenged on constitutional grounds, democratic changes in long-standing
practices must receive careful scrutiny from the courts. Burkeanism might
therefore be used as a shield, enabling government to fend off attacks on
traditions, or instead as a sword, allowing litigants to challenge departures
from long-standing practices.
Within conservative constitutional thought, Burkean minimalism is op-
posed by those who adopt two alternative approaches. The first is
11. A good illustration is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a brisk critique, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 444-45 (1990):
"[Y]ou cannot just admire Burke and think you have found a judicial philosophy. Prudential-
ism is the repeated sounding of a note of caution (repeated, not consistent-a consistently
cautious person would be cautious about caution as well as about everything else), and a tune
with one note soon becomes tedious."
One of my goals here is to respond to Judge Posner's challenge, with the suggestion that Burkean
minimalism is a plausible response to limited information and bounded rationality on the part of the
federal judiciary.
12. See, for example, the emphasis on the history of executive claims settlement in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 683-86 (1981).
13. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 69-74 (2005) (emphasizing need for small
steps and caution in the domain of privacy, but doing so with reference to the theoretical ideal of
active liberty).
14. See supra notes 11-13. Of course there are significant differences between Justice Frank-
furter and Justice O'Connor, to be taken up in due course, and neither justice was always a
practitioner of Burkean minimalism. For example, Justice Frankfurter concurred in the non-Burkean
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Justice O'Connor concurred in
the result, on non-Burkean grounds, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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originalism. Originalists, including Justices Antonin Scalia 5 and Clarence
Thomas, 6 believe that the Constitution should be understood to mean what
it meant at the time that it was ratified. On this view, the ratifiers' under-
standing, defined as the original public meaning, provides the lodestar for
constitutional interpretation. 7 Departures from that understanding are ille-
gitimate, even if those departures are long-standing. It is noteworthy that the
conservative dissenters on the Warren Court, Justices Frankfurter and John
Marshall Harlan, had strong Burkean inclinations and did not typically
speak in terms of the original understanding of the ratifiers."s
The second alternative is conservative perfectionism. Conservative per-
fectionists believe that the Constitution's ideals should be cast in the most
attractive light. Conservative perfectionism is responsible for the attack on
affirmative action programs,' 9 the effort to strike down restrictions on com-
mercial advertising, 20 and the movement to protect property rights against
"regulatory takings.' Conservative perfectionists are not greatly concerned
with the original understanding of the founding document, and they are en-
tirely willing to renovate long-standing practices by reference to ambitious
ideas about constitutional liberty.2 The most influential members of the
Lochner Court were conservative perfectionists.2 In the last decades, Chief
15. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37-47 (1997) [hereinafter
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism].
16. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-53 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for a return to original understanding of the Establishment
Clause).
17. Note that the originalist approach, properly understood, points to the document's original
public meaning, not to the framers' original "intent." See SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 15, at 38. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia also shows occasional Burkean tendencies. See
infra notes 114-117, 175-177 and accompanying text.
18. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (rejecting invalidation of compulsory flag salute); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(Frankfurter & Harlan JJ., dissenting) (concluding that constitutionality of reapportionment schemes
should be treated as a nonjusticiable political question). There are exceptions, in which Justice
Harlan in particular spoke in originalist terms. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (offering a historical challenge to the one-person, one-vote principle).
19. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (invok-
ing principle of color-blindness as basis for attack on race-conscious admissions policy).
20. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (calling for greater protection against regulatory takings). On the difficulty of finding
historical support for this position, see John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000) (arguing that on the origi-
nal understanding, regulatory takings did not offend the clause).
22. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522-24 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing for broad protection of commercial
advertising). Note that Justices Scalia and Thomas are originalists, but that one or the other, or both,
have joined several opinions best characterized as perfectionist. See id.; see also supra notes 15-16.
23. For evidence, see, for example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). The Court's opinions spoke in terms of the ideal of lib-
erty, rather than in terms of the original understanding, established traditions, or clear precedents.
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Justice Rehnquist showed an occasional interest in conservative perfection-
ism.2 4 Of course I am speaking here of ideal types, and no one is likely to be
a consistent practitioner of any particular method; but the different tenden-
cies can nonetheless be attributed to different judges.
What unifies Burkean minimalism, originalism, and conservative perfec-
tionism? The simplest answer is that all three disapprove of those forms of
liberal thought that culminated in the work of the Warren Court and on oc-
casion its successors.2 All three reject the idea, prominent in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, that the Supreme Court should build on footnote four in the
26Carolene Products decision, develop constitutional law by reference to a
theory of democracy,27 and protect traditionally disadvantaged groups from• • •28
majoritarian processes. All three approaches are at least skeptical of Roe v.
Wade, 9 the effort to remove religion from the public sphere, 3° and the at-
tempt to grant new protections to suspected criminals.3' The three
approaches count as conservative simply because of their shared doubts
about the rulings of the Warren Court and the arguments offered by that
Court's most enthusiastic defenders.32
But there are massive disagreements as well. For example, Burkean
minimalists have little interest in originalism. From the Burkean perspective,
originalism is far too radical, because it calls for dramatic movements in the
law, and it is unacceptable for exactly that reason.33 Originalists are in the
grip of a priori reasoning. Burkean minimalists prize stability, and they are
entirely willing to accept rulings that do not comport with the original un-
derstanding when a decision to overrule them would disrupt established
24. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But Chief Justice
Rehnquist has shown strong Burkean tendencies as well, above all in the area of the Establishment
Clause. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
25. But see the important discussion in David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the
Warren Court (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 25, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=315682, arguing that the decisions
of the Warren Court fit comfortably within the method of the common law. It is possible, of course,
to believe that certain decisions comport with the common law method but not with Burkeanism,
simply because of their adventurousness in width and depth (which are hardly unfamiliar for the
common law but which are incompatible with Burkeanism).
26. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
27. A recent effort in this vein is BREYER, supra note 13. Notably, Breyer favors minimalism
in the sense of small steps, id. at 69-74, but his effort to develop a theoretical account of constitu-
tional law makes it difficult to place him in the Burkean camp.
28. The most important exposition is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1983).
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33-71 (1985). Burkean minimalists
might well be prepared, however, to accept the rulings of the Warren Court even if they would not
have joined them as a matter of first impression. See infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
33. For a concise and illuminating statement, see Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509 (1996). CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW Is (2004), can be
taken to have Burkean features, especially in its careful attention to past doctrine; but in the end,
Fried is best characterized as a rationalist minimalist, not as a Burkean.
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practices. Burkean minimalists also prize our constitutional traditions, ex-
tending over decades and even centuries, and see those traditions as the
product not of a particular canonical moment, but of countless decisions by
many actors. On this view, the American Constitution is a product not of a
national judgment in 1787, but of a kind of spontaneous order, reflecting the
acts and judgments of diverse people at diverse moments in history. To
Burkean minimalists, originalism looks uncomfortably close to the French
Revolution, seeking to overthrow settled traditions by reference to an ab-
stract theory.-
Nor do Burkean minimalists have any enthusiasm for conservative per-
fectionism, which they consider far too rationalistic. In the Burkean view,
there is no reason to trust the theory-building efforts of federal judges: theo-
ries are contested and unreliable, and they might well misfire. To be sure,
Burkeans are willing to build on existing law through analogical reasoning,
and this process might allow Burkean minimalists to make common cause
with their perfectionist adversaries. But insofar as members of the latter
group are willing to invoke ambitious accounts (of, say, property rights,
presidential power over war-making, or color-blindness) to produce large-
scale departures from existing practice and law, Burkean minimalists have
no interest in their enterprise.
I have three goals in this Article. The first is to identify the ingredients
of Burkean minimalism-an approach to constitutional adjudication that has
both integrity and coherence, that has played a large role in the history of
American constitutional thought, and that casts fresh light on a number of
contemporary disputes. My second goal is to offer a reconstruction of
Burkean thought that might serve as an alternative to the influential ap-
proach offered by Dean Anthony Kronman.35 On Kronman's approach,
Burkeanism regards the past as having a kind of inherent or intrinsic author-
ity. By contrast, I suggest that Burkeanism is best understood in pragmatic
or consequentialist terms. The argument for Burkeanism is that respect for
traditions is likely to produce better results, all things considered, than reli-
ance on theories of one or another kind, especially when those theories are
deployed by such fallible human beings as judges. This pragmatic approach
has the advantage of showing why Burkeanism makes good sense in some
contexts but none at all in others.
It may well be right, for example, to build separation of powers doctrine
on established practices, but also to approach scientific questions, such as
those involving climate change or the nature of matter, on the basis of the
newest theories rather than the old ones. By keeping the eye on the prag-
matic ball, we can see that in law and politics, Burkeanism operates as a
kind of heuristic, one that might be justified in some domains on rule-
consequentialist grounds. The basic idea is that if courts follow traditions,
they will produce better consequences, all things considered, than they
might under any other approach to interpretation. And if this view is correct,
34. See Merrill, supra note 33, at 512-14.
35. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
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it is necessary to rethink the long-standing opposition between Burke, de-
fender of the common law and great critic of theories, and Jeremy Bentham,
critic of the common law and enthusiastic defender of theory, in particular
utilitarianism, which argues for an approach that will have the best conse-36
quences. To be sure, Burke was hardly a utilitarian, self-consciously or
otherwise, but on certain assumptions and in some areas, Burkeanism can be
understood as a way of promoting utility or at least good consequences-if
only indirectly.
My third goal is to answer a simple question: under what assumptions
and conditions would Burkean minimalism be most appealing? Although I
offer a sympathetic treatment of Burkean minimalism here, I do not believe
that it is defensible in all contexts, even in constitutional law. One of my
central claims is that no approach to constitutional interpretation makes
sense in every possible world. It is certainly easy to imagine times and
places in which judges should reject Burkean minimalism. With respect to
racial segregation in the United States, for example, there has long been a
strong argument for a non-Burkean or even anti-Burkean approach, which
Brown v. Board of Education7 exemplifies. Whether or not Brown can be
defended as minimalist, 3s it is not easily characterized as Burkean, because it
disrupted an established institution in the name of a theory involving equal-
ity on the basis of race. In areas in which traditions are unjust and in which
judges can reliably assess them in constitutionally relevant terms, there is
reason to reject Burkean minimalism. A central competitor to the Burkean
approach is what I shall call "rationalist minimalism"-an approach that
subjects traditions to critical scrutiny and that has played a large role in the
domains of race and sex discrimination and in the area of free speech. In
these and other areas, there may be an argument for some kind of perfec-
tionism as well.39
The most committed Burkeans would likely suggest that Burkeanism
makes sense in all political domains, including those domains that consist of
constitutional law as elaborated by federal judges. A more nuanced approach
would suggest that Burkeanism is easiest to defend when traditions are truly
long-standing and when the relevant institution, loosened from traditions,
has a great deal of power. Rejecting these positions, and speaking in terms
that might not appeal to Burke himself, I shall suggest instead that the case
36. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Brown could be seen as minimalist, rather than perfectionist, if it is regarded as having
built on a series of decisions, rather than as a bolt from the blue. See the outline of the long line of
cases leading to Brown in GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 471-73 (5th ed. 2005).
Brown might even be seen as having a Burkean dimension if it is taken as having been based on
experience, rather than a priori reason or theory. See Strauss, supra note 25. But it seems a stretch to
see Brown in Burkean terms, insofar as the decision showed a willingness to uproot a long-standing
institution by reference to an account of racial equality.
39. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 12-21, 49-74 (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE IN ROBES] (exploring and defending theoretical abstraction in law); DWORKIN, supra note
32, at 33-71 (defending role of courts as "forum of principle").
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for Burkean minimalism is most plausible for federal judges when three
conditions are met: (1) originalism would produce unacceptable conse-
quences; (2) long-standing traditions and practices are trustworthy, or at
least trustworthy enough; and (3) there is great reason to be skeptical of the
rule-elaborating and theory-building capacities of federal judges4 0 Of course
those who are selecting a theory of interpretation must decide whether these
conditions are met, and hence we should expect disagreement across judges
and those who observe them. Reasonable people disagree about whether
originalism would produce unacceptable consequences, in part because they
disagree about what originalism requires, in part because they disagree
about whether what it requires is unacceptable.4 In fact the disagreements
among those who adopt different approaches often involve divisions with
respect to (1), (2), and (3). Those who tend to accept Burkean minimalism-
above all Justices Frankfurter and O'Connor-apparently believe that these
three conditions are often met.
As we shall see, the argument for Burkean minimalism is extremely
strong in the areas of separation of powers and national security, where the
Court rightly gives attention to long-standing practices. But there are areas
in which Burkean approaches are legitimately challenged on the ground that
traditions are either indeterminate or constitutionally vulnerable. Burkean
minimalism bears on a number of unresolved and increasingly pressing di-
lemmas in contemporary constitutional law, ranging from the protection of
individual rights, to the question of presidential authority, to the appropri-
ately Burkean response to non-Burkean, or anti-Burkean, precedents.
The final question is both important and difficult. Suppose that the Court
has departed from Burkean practices in ruling, for example, that the Consti-
tution protects the right to choose abortion. Suppose too that the Court's
ruling has endured for decades. How should the principled Burkean deal
with the right to choose? This question reintroduces some of the conflicts
that the Court was required to resolve in the New Deal period, and it has no
single Burkean answer. In dealing with non-Burkean or anti-Burkean prece-
dents, reasonable Burkeans can differ.
40. Constitutional interpretation occurs outside of federal courts, of course, and representa-
tives and citizens, giving meaning to the founding document, might be loosened from Burkean
strictures. On the difference between judge-made constitutional law and constitutional law as elabo-
rated by citizens and public officials, see CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 145-53
(1993).
41. Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals (and for Conser-
vatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/. What is
striking about Amar's argument is the suggestion that originalism generally leads to results that






1. Narrowness. There are different forms of minimalism, but all of them
share a preference for small steps over large ones. This preference operates
42along two dimensions. First, minimalists favor rulings that are narrow
rather than wide. Narrow rulings do not venture far beyond the problem at
hand, and attempt to focus on the particulars of the dispute before the Court.
When presented with a choice between narrow and wide rulings, minimal-
ists generally opt for the former.
Consider in this light Chief Justice Roberts's suggestion that one advan-
tage of consensus within the Court is that it leads to narrower decisions. In
his words, "[t]he broader the agreement among the justices, the more likely
it is a decision on the narrowest possible grounds., 43 The nine justices have
highly diverse views, and if they are able to join a single opinion, that opin-
ion is likely to be narrow rather than broad. This, in the Chief Justice's view,
is entirely desirable, as he explained with an aphoristic summary of the
minimalist position in constitutional law: "If it is not necessary to decide
more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more.'"
To be sure, the difference between narrowness and width is one of de-
gree rather than kind; no one favors rulings that are limited to people with
the same names or initials as those of the litigants before the Court. But
among reasonable alternatives, minimalists show a persistent preference for
the narrower options, especially in cases at the frontiers of constitutional
law. In such cases, minimalists believe that justices lack relevant informa-
tion; they do not have a full sense of the many situations to which a broad
rule might apply. For this reason, minimalists fear the potentially harmful
effects of decisions that reach far beyond the case at hand.
With respect to the war on terror, for example, the Court has favored
narrow rulings, refusing to say anything about the president's power as
46commander-in-chief and generally leaving a great deal undecided. Or con-
42. I explore minimalism in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999), and CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES (2005).
43. Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Commencement Address
at the Georgetown University Law Center (May 21, 2006).
44. Id. A possible response would be that the justices might unanimously agree on a legal
issue that is not terribly controversial, perhaps as a way of bracketing a far more controversial issue,
but in the process might produce a broad ruling on the less controversial one. Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Roberts is right to say that unanimity generally breeds narrowness.
45. See BREYER, supra note 13, at 66-74 (discussing privacy); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2006).
46. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see
also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (refusing to decide whether the president has inherent
power to create military commissions). A partial exception is Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006), in which the Court addressed a number of issues. Even in Hamdan, however, the Court did
not say a great deal about the president's power as commander-in-chief, even if it implicitly resolved
certain issues against him. See Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security:
Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 Sup. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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sider the "undue burden" standard in the area of abortion 7-a standard that
is rule-free and that calls for close attention to the details of the particular
restriction at issue.48 In the domain of affirmative action, many of the
Court's rulings have been particularistic, arguing that while one program is
unacceptable, another one might not be. 9
Minimalists fear that wide rulings will produce errors that are at once
serious and difficult to reverse-a particular problem when the stakes are
high. Hence it might be thought that narrowness is especially desirable in
any period in which national security is threatened. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case offers the most elaborate dis-
cussion of the basic point.50 Justice Frankfurter emphasized that "[r]igorous
adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial function" is especially impor-
tant in constitutional cases when national security is at risk, notwithstanding
the country's "eagerness to settle-preferably forever-a specific problem
on the basis of the broadest possible constitutional pronouncements.' In his
view, the Court's duty "lies in the opposite direction," through judgments
that make it unnecessary to consider the most delicate questions of constitu-
tional authority.52 Thus the Court has an obligation "to avoid putting fetters
upon the future by needless pronouncements today."53 Maintaining that the
legislative history unambiguously demonstrated that the president's seizures
of steel mills were not congressionally authorized, Justice Frankfurter con-
cluded that "[t]he issue before us can be met, and therefore should be,
without attempting to define the President's powers comprehensively. ' 54 Jus-
tice Frankfurter argued for minimalism on the ground that it reduces the risk
that erroneous judicial decisions will impose undesirable limits on democ-
ratic processes. 5
In many domains, sensible people take small steps in order to preserve
their options, aware as they are that large steps can have unintended bad
47. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Notably, the Court has converged on a kind of rule, at least for educa-
tional institutions: one that forbids quotas and point systems but permits case-by-case judgments
that include consideration of race. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). This rule, or principle,
is skeptically discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899
(2006).
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594-97 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
51. Id. at 594.
52. Id. at 595.
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id. at 597.
55. In the same vein, see BREYER, supra note 13, at 69-74 (emphasizing the need for cau-




consequences, particularly if they are difficult to reverse.56 In law, wide rul-
ings might produce outcomes that judges will come to regret. This point
derives strength from a special feature of adjudication, which often grows
out of particular disputes based on particular facts.57 Unlike legislators and
administrators, judges frequently do not see a broad array of fact patterns.
Lacking information about a range of situations, judges are often in a poor
position to produce wide rulings.
These are points about the risk of error, but there is an additional prob-
lem. For any official, it can be extremely burdensome to generate a broad
rule in which it is possible to have much confidence. Narrow decisions
might therefore reduce the costs of decision at the same time that they re-
duce the costs of error. For the same reason that standards might be
preferred to rules,58 then, narrowness might be preferred to width.
2. Shallowness. Minimalists also seek rulings that are shallow rather
than deep. Shallow rulings attempt to produce rationales and outcomes on
which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their disagreement on or
uncertainty about the most fundamental issues. For example, there are vig-
orous disputes about the underlying purpose of the free speech guarantee'g:
Should the guarantee be seen as protecting democratic self-government, or
the marketplace of ideas, or individual autonomy? Minimalists hope not to
resolve these disputes. They seek judgments and rulings that can attract
shared support from people who are committed to one or another of these
foundational understandings, or who are unsure about the foundations of the
free speech principle. 0 The minimalist preference for shallowness can be
accepted by those who are inclined to one or another foundational account
but believe that it is best if constitutional law can attract support from di-
verse accounts.
The difference between narrowness and shallowness is that the former
speaks to the breadth of the decision, whereas the latter speaks to the level
of theoretical ambition. We could imagine a decision that is narrow and
deep---as, for example, in the idea that sex segregation is unacceptable at a
particular institution (a narrow ruling) because the Equal Protection Clause
prevents the subordination of women (a deep understanding of the clause).
We could imagine a ruling that is wide but shallow-as, for example, in the
56. See DIETRICH D6RNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans.,
Addison-Wesley 1997) (1989) (stressing the value, in experimental settings, of attempting to settle
social problems by taking small, reversible steps).
57. Admittedly, issues before the Supreme Court are often quite general rather than heavily
particularistic, as for example in cases involving broad and ambitious challenges to statutory restric-
tions. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). One of the distinctive features of Burkean
minimalism is the effort to resolve a case in a way that makes the ruling less general than it might
otherwise have been.
58. See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992).
59. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1990).




idea that political speech may not be punished without a showing of a clear
and present danger (a broader ruling), unjustified by a theoretically ambi-
tious account of the free speech principle (and hence shallow). Chief Justice
Roberts was speaking of narrowness, not depth. But unanimous rulings are
also likely to be shallow, simply because diverse people are unlikely to be
able to agree on a theoretically ambitious account of some area of the law.
The minimalist preference for shallowness is rooted in three considera-
tions. First, shallow decisions, no less than narrow ones, simplify the
burdens of decision. To say the least, it can be extremely difficult to decide
on the foundations of an area of constitutional law; shallow rulings make
such decisions unnecessary. Second, shallow rulings may prevent errors. A
judgment in favor of one or another foundational account may well produce
significant mistakes, whereas shallowness is less error-prone, simply by vir-
tue of its agnosticism on the great issues of the day. If several foundational
accounts or all reasonable contenders can converge on one rationale or out-
come, there is good reason to believe that it is right. Third, shallow rulings
tend to promote social peace at the same time that they show a high degree
of respect to those who disagree on big questions.6' In a heterogeneous soci-
ety, it is generally valuable to assure citizens, to the extent possible, that
their own deepest commitments have not been ruled off-limits. By accom-
plishing this task, shallow rulings reduce the intensity of social conflicts.
62
This practical point is supplemented by the fact that those who seek shal-
lowness are demonstrating respect for competing foundational
commitments.63
In the abstract, of course, narrowness and shallowness are nothing to
celebrate. Narrowness is likely to breed unpredictability and perhaps un-
equal treatment. It might even do violence to the rule of law, if only because
it leaves so much uncertainty.64 Here is a problem for Chief Justice Roberts's
call for consensus and narrowness: 9-0 decisions, converging on a narrow
ruling, may actually disserve the predictability that the Chief Justice seeks,
because narrowness leaves many questions undecided. In many contexts,
rules are preferable to standards, and it can be worthwhile to risk the overin-
clusiveness of rules in order to increase clarity, so as to give people a better
61signal of their rights and obligations. In the areas of contract, tort, and
property law, narrowness would be unacceptable, because people require
clarity in those domains. If the rules of property and contract are unclear,
people will not be able to conduct their affairs with the certainty that these
areas of the law demand. People need to know what they own, and they need
to know that their agreements are secure. Of course there are public law
61. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 147-48 (1993).
62. See id. at 146-49 (discussing "modus vivendi" liberalism).
63. Of course, some such commitments are rightly placed out of bounds as a foundation for
constitutional law: consider the commitment to slavery or to the oppression of religious minorities.
64. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178-
83 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 45.
65. Kaplow, supra note 58.
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analogies: administrators need to know when social security disability
claimants are entitled to disability payments, so that the system can run eas-
ily without endless conflicts about the basic rules.
Narrow rulings reduce the burdens imposed on judges in the case at
hand, but they also "export" decision-making duties to others in a way that
can increase those burdens in the aggregate. Insofar as minimalists prize
narrowness, they are vulnerable to challenge on the ground that they leave
too much openness in the system.66
Shallowness certainly has its virtues. But suppose that a deep theory is
correct, in the sense that it reflects the proper approach to a constitutional
provision. If the theory is indeed correct, perhaps judges ought to adopt it.
Why should they refuse to endorse the proper theory? A shallow ruling, one
that is agnostic on the right approach to the Constitution, would seem a ma-
jor error if a more ambitious approach, though contentious, is actually
correct. Assume, for example, that a certain theory--of free speech, the
president's authority as commander-in-chief, property rights-would pro-
duce the right foundation for future development. If so, there is good reason
for courts to endorse it. Minimalists might leave uncertainty about the con-
tent of the law at the same time that they obscure its roots. I will return to
these objections below.
B. Burkean Practices and Burkean Judgments
1. Practices and judgments. There are many different forms of minimal-
ism. Burkean minimalism is one variety, and indeed an especially important
subset of minimalism. We could also imagine Burkeans who are not mini-
malist at all, because they favor wide rulings. 6' But many people who are
drawn to Burke also have important minimalist sympathies, and hence
Burkean minimalism provides a distinctive approach to constitutional law.
It is important to distinguish between Burkean minimalism and its more
rationalist counterpart, which might be associated with Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg68 and Stephen Breyer.69 Of course Burkeans prize shallowness;
opposition to ambitious theories is part of the defining creed of Burkean-
66. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006).
67. See infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (offering theoretical account of
the problem of sex discrimination). It is important to be careful with these comparisons. Justice
Ginsburg believes in small steps and has occasional Burkean inclinations. See, e.g., Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV.
375 (1985) (criticizing Roe v. Wade for proceeding too rapidly).
69. See BREYER, supra note 13. Justice Breyer, no less than Justice Ginsburg, is respectful of
precedent and has some Burkean tendencies-as reflected, for example, in his emphasis on the need
to proceed slowly and incrementally in the domain of privacy, see id. at 69-74; Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion). In this domain,
at least, Justice Breyer is skeptical of the use of a priori reasoning to resolve novel questions; and his
insistent emphasis on experience and consequences, see BREYER, supra note 13, has a Burkean
dimension. But insofar as Breyer emphasizes a theoretical account for organizing constitutional law,
see id. at 15-33, his approach is easily distinguished from that of Justices O'Connor and Frank-
furter, who had no such account.
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ism.70 The more basic point is that while Burkeans want to base their small
steps on established traditions, rationalists are occasionally skeptical of tra-
ditions, and they are willing and sometimes even eager to ask whether
established practices can survive critical scrutiny.
This difference should not be overstated. No real-world minimalist is
likely to accept every tradition as such, even if that minimalist is a commit-
ted Burkean. Indeed, there are both conceptual and practical problems with
any effort to take that path.7 No real-world minimalist is likely to want to
subject many traditions to critical scrutiny, at least not at the same time. Any
such effort would quickly produce a departure from minimalism. In prac-
tice, there is a continuum from more Burkean to more rationalist forms of
minimalism. But it is nonetheless possible to distinguish between the two
sets of minimalists, if only because of their different emphases, which can
lead in radically different directions.72
As it applies to the judiciary, we can understand Burkeanism in two dif-
ferent ways. First, Burkeans might stress actual social practices, and see
those practices, as they extend over time, as bearing on the proper interpre-
tation of the Constitution. A practice-oriented understanding would be
reluctant to invoke a particular conception of the separation of powers to
strike down actions that are long-standing-say, foreign surveillance by the
president, or presidential war-making without congressional authorization.73
On this view, judges in constitutional cases should follow a distinctive
70. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. It is nonetheless true that Burkeanism will
not only refuse to embrace some ambitious theories but also rule them out-and to that extent
Burkeanism will seem contentious to those who hold such theories. For example, current constitu-
tional law rejects the view that citizens, as such, are entitled to a minimal level of housing, food, and
income. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Burkeans reject ambitious theories
and seek incomplete theorization. But their own approach, focused on traditions, will declare certain
theories out of bounds, not only by refusing to embed them specifically in constitutional doctrine (a
tribute to shallowness) but also by insisting that they are not a proper part of that doctrine (a tribute
to Burkeanism). Those who are most committed to shallowness will of course prefer outcomes that
can be joined by Burkeans and non-Burkeans alike. By suggesting that Burkean minimalists em-
brace shallowness, I mean to signal both their opposition to abstract theories and their hope that
narrow rulings, rooted in tradition, might be compatible with several or even many such theories.
Of course the most ambitious Burkeans might favor depth, in the form of acceptance of a par-
ticular approach: Burkeanism. To the extent that Burkeanism is itself theorized-and I attempt to
take some steps in that direction here-it threatens to become deep rather than shallow, notwith-
standing its skepticism about a priori reasoning.
71. The conceptual problem is that traditions are not self-defining, and hence it is not clear
what it means to "follow" any and all traditions. The practical problem is that traditions often con-
flict with each other, and hence following all of them will not be possible. I take up these problems
below. See infra notes 160-169 and accompanying text.
72. Compare, for example, the Court's emphasis on an "emerging awareness" about the
content of liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003), with the argument for deference
to traditional morality in Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, id. at 586-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Lawrence is discussed in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 137-141.
73. See JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005) (noting that war-making, in
American history, has rarely been preceded by a formal declaration of war).
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conception of the role of common law judges, which is to respect and
mimic, rather than to evaluate, time-honored practices.74
In a sense, Burkean courts attempt a delegation of power from individual
judges to firmly rooted traditions.75 For such Burkeans, ambiguous constitu-
76tional provisions should be understood by reference to such traditions, and
judges should be reluctant to allow litigants to challenge them. In voting
against judicial involvement in response to claims for one-person, one-vote,
Justice Frankfurter emphasized not only "a uniform course of decision" but
also "the equally uniform course of our political history regarding the rela-
tionship between population and legislative representation."" Indeed, and
more ambitiously, Burkean judges might even question democratic initia-
tives that reject traditions without very good reason. In ruling that the
president may not create military commissions without congressional au-
thorization, a plurality of the Court placed heavy emphasis on traditions,
ruling that while traditions supported the use of such commissions to try
violations of the law of war, they did not support their use to try conspira-
cies to violate the law of war.7 8
Second, Burkeans might stress not social practices but the slow evolu-
tion of judicial doctrine over time-and might therefore reject sharp breaks
from the judiciary's own past. For these Burkeans, what is particularly im-
portant is the judiciary's prior judgments. which should in turn be based on
a series of small steps, and should avoid radical departures. On this view,
current judges should respect those prior judgments. Justice O'Connor, for
example, showed an inclination to favor this approach to constitutional ad-
judication.79
There are big differences between an approach that focuses on social
practices and one that focuses on judicial decisions. Those who emphasize
practices would be skeptical of evolutionary movements in constitutional
law if those movements depend on the judges' own moral or political judg-
ments, minimalist though they might be. For Burkeans who emphasize
practices, it is not legitimate for judges to build constitutional law through
74. This view is reflected in EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1949), with its emphasis on legal change over time in accordance with changes in social values. See
id. at 3-6.
75. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion)
(emphasizing long-standing tradition of public invocations of God). The rule of stare decisis can
itself be seen as a practice of delegation, eliminating power from the current Court in a kind of
intertemporal, intra-institutional allocation of authority.
76. An obvious example involves presidential power in the domain of international relations,
in which long-standing practices play a large role in interpretation. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
77. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-67 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
79. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (refusing to vote to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy & Souter, JJ., plurality opinion) (refusing to
overrule the central holding of Roe v. Wade).
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small steps that reflect the Court's own judgments over time. But for those
who see the case-by-case evolution of judge-made constitutional law as an
acceptably Burkean project, judicial steps deserve respect, in part because
those steps are unlikely to depart radically from public convictions.8 0
2. Burke. Burke himself emphasized social practices rather than judicial
judgments, but insofar as he spoke of and celebrated "jurisprudence," he
tended to collapse the two.' I do not attempt anything like an exegesis of
Burke, an exceedingly complex figure, in this space, s" but let us turn briefly
to Burke himself and in particular to his great essay on the French Revolu-
tion, in which he rejected the revolutionary temperament because of its
theoretical ambition." Burke's key claim is that the "science of constructing
a commonwealth, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science,
not to be taught a priori." 84 To make this argument, Burke opposes theories
and abstractions, developed by individual minds, to traditions, built up by
many minds over long periods. In a particularly vivid passage, Burke writes:
"We wished at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all
we possess as an inheritance from ourforefathers.... The science of gov-
ernment being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such
80. See Robert Dahl, Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National
Policy-maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957).
81. To the extent that it is an empirical fact that judicial movements turn out to track changes
in social practices, the division may not be quite as important as it seems to be. And indeed that does
seem to be an empirical fact. For an early treatment, see id.; for a recent and broadly compatible
discussion, see MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004). It is reasonable to
doubt, however, whether the committed Burkean should permit constitutional law to evolve with
successful movements, rather than simply requiring constitutional understandings to follow long-
standing traditions. We should distinguish between the clearly Burkean practice of allowing am-
biguous provisions to be "glossed" by traditional practices-in a way that allows elected officials to
do as they wish, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)-and the less Burkean or (better) non-Burkean practice of "updating"
constitutional understandings to fit with values perceived as contemporary, see Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
82. The literature is vast. See, e.g., STANLEY AYLING, EDMUND BURKE: HIS LIFE AND OPIN-
IONS (1988); S. BLAKEMORE, BURKE AND THE FALL OF LANGUAGE (1988); ISAAC KRAMNICK, THE
RAGE OF EDMUND BURKE (1977); CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC
BIOGRAPHY OF EDMUND BURKE (1992); EDMUND BURKE: APPRAISALS AND APPLICATIONS (Daniel
E. Ritchie ed., 1990).
Within the legal literature, the most influential discussion is Kronman, supra note 35. My own
treatment of Burkean minimalism is altogether different from Kronman's, insofar as I emphasize the
limitations of human and judicial knowledge, whereas Kronman attempts, far more ambitiously, to
defend "the ancient but now largely discredited idea that the past has an authority of its own which,
however circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than derivative." Id. at 1047. In my view, this
idea should indeed be discredited on the ground that it is mystical. The real argument for Burkean-
ism, and for fidelity to past practices, depends on the proposition, on the surface of Burke's text, that
the "private stock of wisdom" will often prove less wise than those practices.
83. Burke, supra note 1, at 416-51. In exploring the possibility that traditions are a product
of many minds, and in spelling out that aspect of Burke's writing, I am deliberately abstracting from
the elitist and antidemocratic elements of Burke's claims on behalf of traditions. Consider, for ex-
ample, Burke's fears of the "hoofs of a swinish multitude." Id. at 449. For a general discussion of
this aspect of political thought, with reference to Burke, see DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS
OF THE LOWER ORDERS (1998). I am aware that some of the discussion, and in particular the explo-
ration of Democratic Burkeanism, might seem jarring to those interested in Burke himself.
84. Burke, supra note 1, at 442.
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practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more ex-
perience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and
observing he may be, it is with infinite caution than any man ought to ven-
ture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable
degree, for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up
again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his
eyes."'85
Thus Burke stresses the need to rely on experience and in particular the
experience of generations. He objects to "pulling down an edifice," a meta-
phor capturing the understanding of social practices as reflecting the
judgments of numerous people extending over time. It is for this reason that
Burke describes the "spirit of innovation" as "the result of a selfish temper
and confined views, 86 and offers the term "prejudice" as one of enthusiastic
approval, noting that "instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we
cherish them to a very considerable degree. 87
Why, exactly, would prejudices appeal to Burke? The word itself sup-
plies an answer. Prejudices operate before judgment-they supply answers
that antedate individual reflection. If prejudices are rooted in long-standing
practices, it should not be surprising to find that Burke trusts them.88 Em-
phasizing the critical importance of stability, Burke adds a reference to "the
evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of
obstinacy and the blindest prejudice. 89
Burke's sharpest distinction, then, is between established practices and
individual reason. He contends that reasonable citizens, aware of their own
limitations, will effectively delegate decision-making authority to their own
traditions. "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own pri-
vate stock of reason," because of the concern that any one person's stock "is
small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the
general bank and capital of nations, and of ages. Many of our men of specu-
lation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to
discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them."9
Burke's enthusiasm for traditions, as compared to the private stock of
reason, can be closely linked to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The Jury
Theorem shows that if each individual in a group is more than 50% likely to
be right, the probability that the majority of the group will be right increases
85. Id. at 451.
86. Id. at 428.
87. Id. at 451.
88. We might even see prejudices, on the Burkean view, as part of the family of cognitive
operations sometimes described as "System I'-a rapid, intuitive process opposed to the moral
deliberative and calculative "System I." See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 531 (2005).




to 100% as the size of the group expands.9' Burke appeared to see traditions
as embodying the judgments of many people operating over time. If count-
less people have committed themselves to certain practices, then it is indeed
possible, on Condorcetian grounds, that "latent wisdom" will "prevail in
them," at least if most of the relevant people are more likely to be right than
wrong." The fact that a tradition has persisted provides an additional safe-
guard here: its very persistence might be taken to attest to its wisdom or
functionality, at least as a general rule.
To be sure, it would be possible to object to Burkeanism on the ground
that some traditions (not to mention prejudices) are a product not of wis-
dom, but of a collective action problem, significant disparities in power, or
some kind of social cascade, in which practices persist not because diverse
people decide independently in favor of them, but because people simply
imitate other people.93 Or perhaps most of the people who account for the
tradition are not more than 50% likely to be right. Perhaps they are more
likely to be wrong than right, in which case the collectivity's chance of be-
ing right falls, by Condorcet's own arithmetic, to 0% as the size of the group
expands. These are important objections to Burkeanism in all its forms, and
rationalists invoke those objections in both law and politics. 94 Many tradi-
tions reflect the independent judgments of fewer people than at first appears.
Consider too the fact that recent generations are far more numerous, in
terms of the sheer number of people, than their predecessors. For present
purposes, the only point is that if many independent judgments have been
made on behalf of a social practice, it may well make sense to adopt a pre-
sumption in its favor.
In light of these claims, Burke might be expected to express some skep-
ticism about the common law, perhaps treating it as a form of a priori
intervention by unaccountable officials whose decisions are not rooted in
actual experience. But Burke sees his claims as a reason to value rather than
to repudiate the common law, which he goes so far as to call the "pride of
the human intellect."95  Burke contends that "with all its defects,
91. For a valuable overview, see William P Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias
Through Group Judgment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 147, 152-54 (2002).
92. Particular judges and others might follow a kind of intrapersonal Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem: Consider a person who has accepted an idea or approach at most stages of life, and at one stage
entertains favorably the possibility of a large-scale departure from previous views. She might follow
the long-held idea, distrusting the departure as a kind of French Revolution. Perhaps this could be
based on a priori reasoning-that is, she would be following what worked well for her in previous
situations. Undoubtedly, following this approach often does a great deal of good for judges and
others. The problem here is the same problem faced by the Condorcet Jury Theorem and Burkean-
ism in general: even if a self is seen as a series of selves existing over time, and hence fits the
Condorcetian model, it may be that the prior selves were subject to a cascade (and were less than
50% likely to be right) and the newer, more recent self is the one to trust. (Thanks to Elizabeth
Emens for raising this question.)
93. For discussion, see CAss R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE (2006).
94. See infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
95. Burke, supra note 1, at 456.
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redundancies, and errors," jurisprudence counts as "the collected reason of
ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of
,96human concerns. Of course jurisprudence lacks a simple theory, and it
was hardly constructed a priori; but it is a product of experience, which is its
signal virtue.97 Burke appears to be seeing the common law as a form of
customary law, developing with close reference to actual practices, which it
tends to codify. On this view, theoretical attacks on the common law, based
on (for example) utilitarianism, show far too much confidence in a theory,
and far too little respect for the collective wisdom of entrenched practices.
The same might be said of many areas of constitutional law, in which a
committed Burkean might distrust theoretical abstractions in favor of the
occasionally unruly and apparently self-contradictory rulings that are built
on the foundation of particulars.
It remains possible to ask on what grounds, exactly, traditions might be
thought to be reliable. Skeptics would insist that it is impossible to be a
Burkean all. the way down, in the sense of believing that traditions supply
their own defense. I will return to this objection below.9' For the moment,
the belief is that by virtue of their longevity and in particular their support
from countless people, traditions are likely to provide good service to those
whom they regulate.
3. Burke and judicial review. Burke did not, of course, develop an ac-
count of judicial review; English courts lacked (and lack) the power to strike
down legislation, and hence it could not possibly have occurred to Burke to
explore the nature and limits of that power. Indeed, Burkeans might be
tempted to reject judicial review altogether, perhaps on the ground that
judges are too likely to go off on larks of their own. Perhaps little revolu-
tions, of the kind if not on the scale that Burke despised, are a predictable
product of an independent judiciary entrusted with the power of invalida-
tion. We could easily imagine a Burkean challenge to the institution of
judicial review, seeing it as an invitation to the exercise of a priori reason.
96. Id.
97. Hayek's work on morality and law makes similar claims. Thus Hayek emphasizes the
development of social practices not through individual reason, which cannot be trusted, but through
the contributions of countless people. See Friedrich Hayek, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals:
A Problem for Science, in THE ESS NCE OF HAYEK 318 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds.,
1984). In Hayek's unmistakably Burkean words, "our morals endow us with capacities greater than
our reason could do," and hence "traditional morals may in some respects provide a surer guide to
human action than rational knowledge," in areas ranging from respect for property to the family
itself. Id. at 330. In a quite Burkean sentence, Hayek writes:
It is the humble recognition of the limitations of human reason which forces us to concede su-
periority to a moral order to which we owe our existence and which has its source neither in
our innate instincts, which are still those of the savage, nor in our intelligence, which is not
great enough to build better than it knows, but to a tradition which we must revere and care for
even if we continuously experiment with improving its parts-not designing but humbly tink-
ering on a system which we must accept as given.
Id.
98. See infra notes 243-273 and accompanying text.
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But for those who sympathize with Burke's arguments, a Burkean ac-
count of judicial review is not difficult to sketch. Indeed, Burkeans might
well be hospitable to a judicial role in reviewing legislation, at least if that
role is understood in a certain way. On the Burkean view, the central role of
the courts is to protect long-standing practices against renovations based on
theories, or passions, that show an insufficient appreciation for those prac-
tices. The goal would be to provide a safeguard against the revolutionary or
even purely rationalistic spirit in democratic legislatures.
Nor is this view at all foreign to American constitutional law. The Due
Process Clause has long been understood in traditionalist terms. In his dis-
senting opinion in Lochner, Justice Holmes, though not a Burkean,99 struck
an unmistakably Burkean chord when he wrote that the clause would be
violated if "a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been under-
stood by the traditions of our people and our law."' ° The incorporation of
the Bill of Rights had a great deal to do with Burkean thinking, especially
insofar as it was engineered by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter ex-
plicitly urged that courts should ask whether proceedings "offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of Eng-
lish-speaking peoples."' 0 ' And in the end, the incorporation decision has
become rooted in a judgment about whether "a particular procedure is fun-
damental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty."'10 2 Of course it would be possible to understand
"ordered liberty" in a priori or purely theoretical terms. But in the account
that Justice Frankfurter urged, the focus has been on "an Anglo-American
regime," which placed the emphasis squarely on an identifiable tradition.
Note also that in Justice Frankfurter's hands, and perhaps in others' too, the
emphasis on tradition itself has a democratic element: if a practice has long
been a part of Anglo-American law, then many people have approved it ex-
plicitly or implicitly. Many traditions have been constructed by citizens,
rather than imposed on them. Burkean opposition to social engineering can
be understood in this light.'0 3
Much of the time, modem substantive due process has also been under-
taken with close reference to tradition. Justice Harlan's influential approach
was based on "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history
[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."' 4 More
recently, efforts to cabin the use of substantive due process have been rooted
99. See infra text accompanying notes 253-255; see also Richard A. Posner, Introduction to
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES ix, xxii-xxiii (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (noting Holmes's skepticism
and pragmatism).
100. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
102. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
103. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1999).




in the suggestion that unless the right in question can claim firm roots in
tradition, courts should not intervene.' 5 In rejecting the right to physician-
assisted suicide, the Court said that substantive due process has been "care-
fully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be
deeply rooted in our legal tradition"-an approach that "tends to rein in the
subjective elements" and that "avoids the need for complex balancing" in
particular cases by fallible judges.'06 Thus the Court's inquiry was framed by
asking "whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation's tradi-
tions." 07
On this highly Burkean and anti-perfectionist view, growing out of
Holmes's dissenting opinion in Lochner, the Court should not strike down
legislation merely because it offends the justices' account of reason or jus-
tice, or even because it is inconsistent with evolving or current social norms.
It is necessary also to show a violation of principles that are at once long-
standing and deeply held. Of course the Court has often refused to follow
this Burkean approach to the Due Process Clause, in a way that has sharply
divided Burkeans on the one hand from rationalist minimalists and perfec-
tionists on the other.'
08
4. Shields, swords, and Democratic Burkeanism. This latter point sug-
gests the need to make a distinction between two kinds of Burkean
decisions: those that uphold and those that invalidate democratic judgments.
As I have suggested, Burkeanism can operate as a shield to insulate gov-
ernment against constitutional challenges or a sword supporting those
challenges. By their very nature, Burkeans should be sympathetic to efforts
by state and federal governments to defend established practices against
constitutional attack. If, for example, states are attempting to ban same-sex
relations, to regulate obscenity, or to depart from the idea of one-person,
one-vote, their decisions might be supported on Burkean grounds.' °9 When
government is acting in a way that seems to favor a kind of religious belief,
Burkeans should not object if that form of favoritism has clear support in
long-standing social traditions. Strikingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist's defense
105. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (emphasizing need to apply the Due
Process Clause by reference to established traditions).
106. Id. at 722.
107. Id. at 723.
108. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). It is possible to read Lawrence as a
perfectionist decision, accepting a broad understanding of sexual autonomy, see Laurence Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1893 (2004), or, alternatively, as a more minimalist decision rooted in evolving social understand-
ings, see Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 27. In neither case is Lawrence easily defended on Burkean grounds.
The best effort might suggest that prohibitions on consensual sodomy, while long on the books,
were subject to a recent pattern of nonenforcement. See id. Perhaps the committed Burkean would
bow to the social practice of nonenforcement and strike down the (wildly infrequent) uses of the law
as inconsistent with that practice. But for the Burkean, this is a stretch, simply because it is hard to
see prohibitions on sodomy as violative of long-standing traditions.
109. Insofar as Justice Scalia has emphasized the need to permit traditional morals regulation,




of the use of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is an almost
entirely Burkean exercise. His emphasis is on the historical practices, which
argue in favor of permitting the use of those words, rather than on the justi-
fications for or justifiability of those practices; the mere historical fact of
public acknowledgement of the existence of God seems to be enough for
him.' 0 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the Establishment Clause
has a persistent Burkean feature, at least insofar as he would permit public
recognition of God by reference not to theories or principle, but by reference
to history alone."'
The separation of powers might be understood in similar terms. When
the president is engaging in action in which presidents have long engaged,
and with congressional acquiescence, Burkeans would be strongly inclined
to uphold that action. The central point is more general. If Burkeanism
operates as a shield to be used on government's behalf, we could easily
imagine an endorsement by many Burkeans of a kind of bipartisan re-
straint-on the theory that decisions about whether to change long-standing
practices should be made democratically, not by judges. " ' (Of course more
thoroughgoing Burkeans would oppose democratic as well as judicial altera-
tions of traditions-unless, perhaps, it was possible to identify a long-
standing practice of allowing democratic institutions to make substantial
breaks from traditions.)
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Virginia,"4 Justice Scalia
spoke in exactly these terms. He began by emphasizing that the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI) "has served the people of the Commonwealth of
Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half.""5 On this
view, the longevity of sex segregation at VMI was a good reason for the
Court to stay its hand. In Justice Scalia's view, the Burkean point provides a
cautionary note for judges but not for citizens, who need not be Burkean and
who are entirely free to conclude "that what they took for granted is not so,
and to change their laws accordingly."" 6 Justice Scalia concluded that this
democratic liberty to alter existing practices on anti-Burkean grounds is it-
self time-honored: "So to counterbalance the Court's criticism of our
ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They left us free to change.""' 7
110. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26-33 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment). What is striking about Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is its nearly
exclusive reliance on historical practices, treated as closely analogous to the use of the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Emphasizing those practices, Chief Justice Rehnquist makes
almost no effort to defend them in principle, in a way that fits well with one understanding of Burke.
Ill. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
112. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 612-13 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). In particular, see the lengthy historical appendix, id. at 615.
113. For a classic defense of bipartisan restraint, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
114. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
115. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




In short, Justice Scalia was writing as a Democratic Burkean--one whose
Burkeanism provides a limitation on judges, but not on political partici-
pants.
But it is also possible to use Burkeanism as a sword. If government is
dramatically altering the status quo, Burkeanism might be invoked as the
basis for attacking the attempted alteration. We have seen that the Due Proc-
ess Clause has been so invoked. " " This is Holmes's understanding of
substantive due process as including a (sharply limited) role for traditional
barriers on government behavior. There are analogues in other domains, in
which established traditions have also helped to convince courts to impose
limits on what government may do."9 In striking down an unusual Colorado
law that prohibited gays and lesbians from obtaining local antidiscrimina-
tion measures, the Court said, "[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition
to enact laws of this sort."' 20 A variation on this approach can be found in the
Hamdan plurality's use of traditional practices to decide that the president
lacks the authority to use military commissions to try a suspected terrorist
for conspiracy to violate the law of war.1
2
1
It emerges that for purposes of constitutional law, Burkeanism comes in
both democratic and antidemocratic varieties. The antidemocratic varieties
emphasize the wisdom of traditions and regard innovations as modest ver-
sions of the French Revolution, reflecting constitutionally vulnerable hubris,
passion, or folly. The democratic varieties are unwilling to allow any kind of
rationalistic revolution through the courts-but they are entirely hospitable
to democratic efforts to rethink traditions. Of course Democratic Burkean-
ism might be seen as a contradiction in terms. To the committed Burkean,
the decisions of representative institutions cannot easily claim legitimacy if
they overthrow long-standing practices, and certainly not if those decisions
are in the grip of a theory. But it would be possible for more ambivalent and
less committed Burkeans to contend that the argument for Burkeanism de-
pends on institutional considerations-and that judges should accept
Burkean principles to the extent of refusing to disrupt long-standing prac-
tices on their own.
5. Shallow but wide? In this light, we could identify a Burkean approach
to the Constitution that endorses shallowness while also embracing width
and sometimes even large steps in Burkean directions. This approach would
be minimalist along one dimension but not so along other. It would be
minimalist in its rejection of ambitious theories, but it would be non-
minimalist in its enthusiasm for wide rulings, not limited to the facts of par-
ticular cases.
118. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down government
intrusion on familial living arrangements as inconsistent with long-standing traditions).
119. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (emphasizing long-standing practices in
limiting authority of secretary of state to deny passports to Communists).
120. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
121. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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Suppose that tradition and experience are the best sources of constitu-
tional meaning. Suppose we agree that under the Due Process Clause in
particular, traditionalism should discipline judicial judgment. Justice Scalia
has so urged, largely in the interest of width. 22 Insofar as Chief Justice
Rehnquist would invoke long-standing practices to permit public invocation
of God, he would rule widely, not narrowly.
2 1
Some Burkeans, insistent on rule of law virtues, would follow Burke's
skepticism about abstract theories, and particularly about their deployment
by judges, while also rejecting case-by-case particularism. Imagine, for ex-
ample, a decision to return to a quite specific, historically rooted
understanding of the scope of substantive due process-a decision that
would have to count as a large step insofar as it would dramatically alter
existing law. Or consider the view that public references to God raise no
constitutional problem, simply because such references have been with us
for a long time.124 Of course a good Burkean would seek to know a great
deal about context; perhaps some references to God are harder to defend, on
traditional grounds, than others. But it is plausible that an investigation of
actual practice would produce wide judgments, not narrow ones.
We might therefore distinguish between Burkean minimalists who prize
narrowness as well as shallowness, and those ambivalently minimalist
Burkeans who favor width but reject depth. Perhaps sensible Burkeans must
•• 125
reject a static approach to tradition, one that freezes existing practice, es-
pecially as circumstances change. But Burkeanism as such need not forbid
width in constitutional law. Interestingly, however, Justices Frankfurter and
O'Connor-leading Burkean minimalists in the nation's history-favored
narrowness no less than shallowness, on the evident ground that in the most
126controversial domains, wide rulings are too likely to produce error.
C. Two Kinds of Minimalism
1. Burke and rational criticism of traditions. Rationalist minimalists
seek narrowness and shallowness, but they are entirely willing to rethink
traditions and established practices. Such minimalists are interested in the
reasons behind practices, not in practices themselves. An underlying idea is
that traditions are often unjust or arbitrary and that society frequently pro-
gresses by subjecting them to serious challenge. On this view, the delegation
of decision-making authority to long-standing traditions is perverse, and
Burke was quite wrong to treat "prejudice" as a word of approval. We shall
122. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
123. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
124. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26-33 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
125. Burke himself emphasized the non-static nature of traditions. See infra note 166.
126. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1952) (Frank-




see that the rationalist view can claim support in what might be called Pas-
cal's challenge to Burke, emphasizing that current generations are, in a
sense, older than past ones, and that those who are now living are in that
sense "the ancients.' 2 7
Consider, for example, the long series of decisions striking down dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. In those decisions, the Court did not act
abruptly. Instead it built up the doctrine by small, incompletely theorized
steps. But it could not claim to rest its doctrine on traditions. On the con-
trary, the sex discrimination cases offer a narrative of progress and learning
over time and thus squarely reject Burkeanism. They do so by repeatedly
opposing "reasoned analysis" to "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women"29 and to the "accidental byprod-
uct of a traditional way of thinking about females,"' 3° with the suggestion
that laws that are such "accidental byproducts" are unconstitutional for that
very reason.' Tradition serves in these cases as a term of opprobrium, not
praise."' Indeed, the Court has struck down sex discrimination on the ex-
press ground that it is a product of habit and tradition, rather than reason,
and it has required government to defend any such discrimination in terms
that Burkeans would find puzzling at best."'
Nor can Burkeanism account for the Court's decisions establishing the
right to vote, including the one-person, one-vote rule'34 and even Bush v.
Gore.'35 The doctrine here developed by increments, but the Court hardly
built on traditions. Indeed, the rise of the one-person, one-vote rule was
originally criticized on heavily Burkean grounds, with the suggestion that
the Court was allowing a contentious theory to override long-standing prac-136 137
tices.136 The Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, striking down the ban
127. See infra text accompanying notes 260-265.
128. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Rebecca Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J.
177 (1993), might well be understood as a general defense of rationalist minimalism. FRIED, supra
note 33, is in the same vein, with its emphasis on the need both to pay close attention to doctrine and
to rationalize it.
129. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 750 (1984) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
130. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 442 (1998) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
131. Heckler, 465 U.S. at 750.
132. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 442.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women, 458
U.S. 718 (1982). A noteworthy feature of Virginia is the suggestion that efforts to justify sex segre-
gation in terms that involve educational diversity and opportunity might be plausible if those efforts
had been made in the recent rather than distant past-with the corresponding suggestion that an old
law, not plausibly rooted in those concerns, could not be so defended. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540.
134. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
135. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
136. See Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 252
(1962).
137. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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on same-sex sodomy, is a good illustration of rationalist minimalism." In
Lawrence, the Court did not and could not claim that its decision was se-
curely rooted in long-standing traditions. On the contrary, the Court
emphasized an "emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex. ' Hence the Court looked forward to what was now
emerging, not backward to what was long settled. On this account, the pre-
sent knows far better than the past. In the Court's view, what was emerging
was a product of sense and hard-won wisdom rather than arrogance or hu-
bris. This narrative of progress, seeing traditions as badly confused or even
invidious, is entirely foreign to Burkeanism.
Of course we could imagine a Burkean claim that at a certain point, an
"emerging awareness" has become a tradition. This claim would be more
plausible if the awareness were embodied not merely in judicial decisions,
but also in social practices and norms. Perhaps the ban on sex discrimination
can be so counted, as that ban has been understood in both law and practice
after a period of several decades. Perhaps the same can be said for broad
presidential power to protect national security-power that might seem a
product of an "emerging awareness" of what is necessary for self-defense.'
40
But in Lawrence, the Court did not claim that, with respect to privacy, the
emerging awareness was entrenched. Instead it offered an account of devel-
oping wisdom-an account that is embodied in a serious challenge to Burke
by both Pascal and Bentham, emphasizing that present generations have
more experience than past generations. 41
In many areas, the Supreme Court has acted in common law fashion, but
in a way that is sharply critical of traditions14 2 and that looks toward to a
constitutionally preferred future. Indeed, much of equal protection doctrine
is forward-looking in this sense, rooted in a norm of equality that challenges
long-standing practices. 43 There is a large difference between the Due Proc-
ess Clause and the Equal Protection Clause here. As we have seen, due
process doctrine builds, if sometimes awkwardly and ambivalently, on tradi-
tions, and it can be seen, in a sense, as embodying Justice Frankfurter's
approach to constitutional law. By contrast, equal protection doctrine is
sharply critical of traditions, setting out a principle that challenges practices
of racial subjugation, and that has been elaborated in a way that goes well
beyond the defining case of race and that attacks, rather than incorporates,
social traditions. " Much of the recent and current debate involves the nature
138. It would be possible to understand Lawrence as perfectionist rather than minimalist. See
Tribe, supra note 108.
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
140. See Yoo, supra note 73.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 259-265.
142. See Strauss, supra note 25.
143. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
144. See id. at 1170-78.
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and extent of that attack, 45 with Burkeans asking the Court to limit its
reach.)46
Establishment Clause doctrine has a similar feature, with history often
creating problems for the Court's attempt to construct a theory of neutral-
ity-a theory that seems to be in some tension with historical practices.147 As
I have noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist speaks in unmistakably Burkean terms
in this domain. He would permit public invocations of God, justifying them
almost solely by reference to traditional practices.141 In sharp contrast, Jus-
tice Breyer insists that tradition is hardly enough; it is also necessary to
show that any such invocations fit with the various purposes of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 49 Speaking as a committed minimalist, Justice Breyer
emphasizes that "no single mechanical formula ... can accurately draw the
constitutional line in every case."'5° Speaking as a non-Burkean rationalist,
Justice Breyer calls traditions to account, asking for assurance that a public
display suggests "little or nothing of the sacred,'' and conveys "a predomi-
nantly secular message." 52 Justice Stevens, also a rationalist, writes in
similar terms, insisting (against those who focus on "our heritage") that
judges must apply "the broad principles that the Framers wrote ... by ex-
pounding the meaning of constitutional provisions with one eye towards our
Nation's history and the other fixed on its democratic aspirations."'53
More generally, rationalist minimalists are willing to conclude that en-
trenched traditions might reflect power, confusion, accident, and injustice,
rather than wisdom and sense. ' It should be no surprise that Justice
O'Connor, with her Burkean inclinations, refused to join the Court's opinion
in Lawrence,"' partly because the Court was overruling its own fairly recent
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
5 6
145. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating sex segregation,
notwithstanding its longevity).
146. Id. at 568-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
148. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
149. Id. at 2868-71 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
150. Id. at 2868.
151. Id. at 2870.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2888-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 3, at 1 ("It has been frequently remarked that it seems
to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good govern-
ment from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force.").
155. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
156. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Of course Justice O'Connor has occasionally been willing to subject
traditions to critical scrutiny.'57 In the domain of religion in particular, "his-
tory and ubiquity" play an important role for her, not (as Chief Justice
Rehnquist would have it) because tradition makes its own claims, but be-
cause ubiquitous practices are less likely to have a religious meaning."' But
there is nonetheless a strong Burkean strand in Justice O'Connor's opinions,
insisting on the need to look to practice and experience, rather than to any-
thing like abstract theory. Indeed, her opinion upholding an affirmative
action program at the University of Michigan Law School emphasized the
extent to which race-conscious programs had become an entrenched part of
the practices of businesses and even the military.'59 Hence the validation of
such programs could be seen as reflecting a Burkean unwillingness to use an
abstract theory-based on the idea of color-blindness-as the foundation of
an attack on actual practices. Justice O'Connor seems to believe that the
legitimacy of race-conscious admissions programs should be assessed by
reference to experience, not by reference to some a priori theory about
equality.
2. Traditions in packages? (a) The problem. At this stage the distinction
between Burkean and rationalist minimalism might be challenged on the
ground that traditions do not come in neat packages for judicial identifica-
tion. Traditions are hardly self-defining, and this point severely complicates
the Burkean enterprise. When a court attempts to follow a tradition, what,
exactly, is it supposed to follow? Should a tradition be characterized at a
high level of generality (involving, say, respect for intimate personal
choices) or a low level (allowing, say, government interference with such
choices when traditional morality is being violated)? When circumstances
change-as a result, for example, of the rise of terrorism-how should we
characterize an apparent "tradition" of limited presidential prerogatives?
Might not any such characterization have an evaluative element, and might
the task not be a simple matter of discovery?
Consider, for example, the question whether tradition grants the presi-
dent the authority to engage in foreign surveillance. 6° Even if it is agreed
that many presidents have exercised that authority, perhaps a modem sur-
veillance program is relevantly different, because modem technologies,
involving email and cell phones, permit far greater intrusions into the do-
main of personal privacy. If so, the existence of a long-standing practice
need not count in favor of a contemporary assertion of power, at least if that
power is being used in a way that goes well beyond traditions. Even if it is
157. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Indeed, Justice O'Connor
concurred in the result in Lawrence v. Texas, relying not on the Due Process Clause, often taken to
embody traditional understandings, but instead on the Equal Protection Clause, a frequent source of
constitutional attacks on those understandings. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580-81.
158. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37-39 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
159. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003).
160. See supra note 9.
November 20061
Michigan Law Review
agreed that presidents have not exercised that authority, perhaps a modem
surveillance program is relevantly different, because the threat of interna-
tional terrorism raises problems never encountered in the past. If so, the
absence of a long-standing practice need not count against a contemporary
assertion of power.
Indeed, Justice Thomas made an argument of exactly this sort in reject-
ing the Hamdan plurality's conclusion that traditions forbid the use of
military commissions to try conspiracy to violate the law of war. While
challenging that conclusion on its own merits, Justice Thomas also argued
that the war against terror is genuinely new, and that old traditions, designed
for old enemies, must be permitted to evolve in dealing with the kinds of
war in which the United States is now engaged. 6' On this view, the error of
the plurality lay in the use of traditions to forbid a practice that could not be
said to be inconsistent with the past, simply because the past did not present
the current situation.
Suppose, plausibly, that nearly every current dispute is, in one or another
way, distinguishable from disputes that were settled in the past. Perhaps
Burkean minimalists must ultimately turn out to be rationalists, in the sense
that any particular account of tradition must ultimately be their own, and
based on their "private stock of reason." Perhaps the resulting account will
have a normative dimension. 62 On this view, any characterization of a tradi-
tion will have to be interpretive, in the sense that it will be a matter not of
finding something, but of placing long-standing practices in what judges
deem to be a reasonable or sensible light. Some people contend that tradi-
tions should be read at a high level of generality, so as to contain certain
abstractions that might then be used to test, and find wanting, particular
practices, even long-standing ones.' 64 If traditions are so used, changes
might be sought not in spite of traditions but in their name. If so, the distinc-
tion between Burkean and rationalist minimalism begins to vanish. For this
reason, the Burkean approach might have an inevitable rationalist dimen-
sion, one that is obscured by traditionalist talk.
61
(b) Burkean responses and Democratic Burkeanism Redux. Burkeans
have several possible responses. First, they might acknowledge this point
and urge that their Burkeanism is fully consistent with it. Burke himself be-
lieved that traditions were far from static.' 66 His claim was that social change
161. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2829 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162. See J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1613, 1618 (1990) (questioning Justice Scalia's "call for respecting the most specific tradition
available").
163. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
164. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL L. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
(1991); Tribe, supra note 108.
165. A valuable discussion, suggesting the importance of making the distinction I am draw-
ing, is in MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
166. For example, Burke approved of the Glorious Revolution:
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should emerge from traditions, not in opposition to them. In distinguishing
between "emergence" and "opposition," some work will have to be done in
characterizing traditions. If this is the central point, the line between
Burkean and rationalist minimalism does become thinner, if only because
reason will have to be used in deciding what kind of change should occur-
a major concession to rationalists.
But perhaps we can thicken the relevant line. Perhaps Burkeans will
want to adopt a presumption in favor of democratic outcomes-an inclina-• 167
tion that divides Justice Frankfurter, who adopted such a presumption,
from Justice O'Connor, who did not. 68 On this view, the best understanding
of Burkean minimalism ensures that courts will rarely strike down legisla-
tion unless that legislation is palpably inconsistent with traditions that can
be clearly understood as such, or defies the unmistakable lessons of long
experience.'6 Change can occur, and traditions can be revised, but through
democratic rather than judicial judgments. On this view, the difference be-
tween Burkeans and rationalist minimalists is that members of the latter
group are far more willing to invoke their own moral and political argu-
ments to invalidate legislation. On this view, committed Burkeans will
require a clear demonstration that a constitutional challenge is firmly rooted
in tradition before invalidating a law-a position with clear roots in Justice
Holmes's approach to the Due Process Clause. The problem of characteriz-
ing traditions is resolved, or at least reduced, by refusing to strike down
laws unless the characterization of tradition is uncontentious.
Recall that some people are Democratic Burkeans. They will uphold
government power unless it is inconsistent with tradition, but they are reluc-
tant to invalidate official judgments even if those judgments depart from
tradition. On this view, the absence of a clear tradition in favor of foreign
surveillance by the president need not be decisive of the constitutional ques-
tion, especially because the problem of international terrorism is novel.
This view cannot be supported by Burkeanism alone. It mixes Burkean
claims with democratic ones. For Democratic Burkeans, the central idea is
that in a democratic society, judges should invalidate legislation only when
A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. Without
such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the Constitution which it wished the most
religiously to preserve. The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at
the two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a
king.
Burke, supra note 1, at 424. Thus the revolution "was made to preserve our ancient indisputable
laws and liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which is our only security for law
and liberty." Id. at 428.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 224-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
168. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
169. It might be possible to read Lawrence in this way, at least if the case is seen as involving
a rarely enforced statute that served largely as a recipe for harassment, in defiance of the rule of law.
See Sunstein, supra note 108.
170. Of course, the legality of such surveillance raises complex statutory and constitutional
questions, which I cannot explore here.
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it amounts to a clear violation of the Constitution, read with close reference
to long-standing practices.17 1 In the American context, most people should
be willing to insist that judges should be reluctant to strike legislation down
on the basis of their own convictions. At the same time, Democratic
Burkeans would also claim that citizens in the democratic process should
usually feel free to invoke their convictions in order to challenge long-
standing practices. If citizens and their representatives are permitted to offer
their own understandings of liberty and equality or even their own interpre-
172tations of the Constitution -at least when they are expanding and not
contracting rights as established by the courts '-perhaps they can under-
stand the document in a non-Burkean way, even while judges are held to
traditions. If traditions are a mixed blessing, and if they reflect confusion
and error (and if "prejudice" is properly taken as a word of opprobrium),
then we would not want citizens to hew so closely to the past-even if
judges should be constrained in that way. Using Burkeanism in pragmatic
terms, a judge, or a critic of the judiciary, might well be drawn to this posi-
tion.
A possible response would be that in some domains, citizens themselves
might be too tradition-bound-too likely to follow old practices that are no
longer legitimate, if they ever were, when legitimacy is assessed by refer-
ence to constitutional ideals (properly understood). And this indeed is the
view of rationalist minimalists and of perfectionists, who contend that the
federal judiciary has a legitimate role in testing the grounds for such prac-
tices as restrictions on political dissent, favoritism toward certain religions,
and discrimination on certain grounds. I will return to these debates below.
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(c) Traditions at low levels of abstraction. Alternatively, Burkeans might
insist on reading traditions at a low level of abstraction, in a way that will
minimize the theory-building and tradition-characterizing duties of the judi-
ciary. 75 Justice Scalia, emphasizing deference to tradition, points to the need
to consider "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."'7 6 This ap-
proach promotes width at the same time it expressly denies judges the
power "to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions ... in gen-
171. This view can be seen as a modest and friendly amendment, or specification, of that
offered in Thayer, supra note 113. Thayer argued that courts should invalidate legislation only when
the constitutional question was very clear. Id. at 144. The Burkean version says that whether the
question is clear is answered by reference to tradition.
172. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); SUNSTEIN, supra note 40.
173. The various civil rights laws, not easily defensible on Burkean grounds, can be seen as
examples. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000); Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (2000).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 243-252.
175. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 & n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opin-
ion).
176. Id. at 127 n.6.
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eral. ' "' By rejecting that power, and by distrusting the effort to "reason
from" tradition, Justice Scalia is squarely embracing a Burkean approach to
the role of the Court in constitutional cases. He is reading the Due Process
Clause so as to delegate authority to tradition, rather than to authorize
judges to use tradition as a foundation for normative arguments of their own.
If it is stipulated that traditions should be read at a low level of abstraction,
then it is genuinely possible to follow them, rather than to characterize
them. In the context of separation of powers, we might also characterize the
practice at a low level of abstraction, in a way that (for example) might
make it more difficult for the president to argue that there is a clear tradition
supportive of a controversial exercise of authority.
Critics of Burkean minimalism might object, at this point, that Burkean-
ism cannot be really rescued, as a neutral method, through the effort to read
traditions at a low level of abstraction. What level of abstraction counts as
"low"? The lowest level of abstraction would focus on what, very specifi-
cally, was done-in which case no tradition would resolve a current dispute,
which, by hypothesis, involves a different time, different circumstances, and
different parties. If the government said that people may not have more than
two children, it would be easy to say that such a prohibition violates long-
standing traditions, to which the prohibition does indeed seem foreign. But
characterized at the lowest level of abstraction, the tradition-of procreative
liberty-may not really apply to the current dispute, which involves a new
time and by hypothesis a new situation. The anti-Burkean would insist that
whether it does apply depends on a normative judgment about how to char-
acterize it.
The best response, from the Burkean point of view, is that if there is in-
deed some kind of difference in circumstances, the tradition may not apply,
and hence cannot be used. But the difference must be explained, not simply
asserted. Sometimes there is no plausible difference between the cases to
which the long-standing practice applied and the modem case. To know
whether there is such a difference, it is true that the Burkean has to think
about traditions rather than simply point to them. But much of the time, it is
clear that no tradition supports a purported right, and it is also clear that the
government is seeking to violate a long-standing practice simply because it
rejects it on principle. In such cases, the Burkean path is clear.
Here, then, is a sharp difference between Burkean and rationalist mini-
malists. While agreeing with their rationalist adversaries on the need for
small steps, Burkean minimalists applaud their rationalist adversaries for
their insistence on small steps, but would be reluctant to create new rights,
such as the right to physician-assisted suicide. 17 In contrast, more rationalist
minimalists might well be willing to do so. If the Burkean position is to be
defended, it is on the ground that traditions, taken as they actually have
been, are more reliable than individual judges relying on their respective
177. Id.
178. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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private stocks of reason.179 I believe that rationalist minimalists have some
strong objections here, but let us bracket that point for now.
It should be apparent that insofar as Burkean minimalists adopt either a
presumption in favor of democratic processes or an insistence on reading
traditions at a low level of generality, they become less minimalist, because
they reject narrowness in constitutional doctrine and begin to convert the
doctrine into a system of rules. And as I have noted, we could imagine a
Burkean who favors both shallowness and width, the latter perhaps in the
service of the former.80
III. THE CONDITIONS FOR BURKEAN MINIMALISM
No approach to constitutional law makes sense in every imaginable con-
text. The Constitution does not offer a manual of instructions for its own
interpretation, and hence the choice of a theory of interpretation very much
depends on judgments about the institutional capacities of courts and legis-
latures.' 8' With different judgments about those capacities, certain
approaches to interpretation become more or less appealing.
Take, for example, the dispute between those who favor textualist ap-
proaches and those who believe that courts should stress purpose rather than
text. 8 2 We can imagine circumstances in which one or another approach
makes the most sense. If textualism would lead to greater before-the-fact
care from legislators, and also to rapid after-the-fact corrections, the argu-
ment for textualism would be greatly fortified. Textualism would also be the
optimal method of interpretation if courts would blunder under a purpose-
based approach. But if textualism would often lead to unintended absurdity,
and if courts could discern purpose both quickly and accurately, the argu-
ment for purposivism would be much strengthened. In short, the choice
between textualism and purposivism rests in large part on judgments about
institutional capacities,183 and these judgments cannot be made in the ab-
stract ..1
4
179. See also Hayek, supra note 97. On one (sympathetic) understanding of Burke, the prob-
lem is that it is not possible to obtain a perspective from outside of our tradition; we are inevitably a
product of it. See Kronman, supra note 35, at 1032-34. In some general sense this is undoubtedly
true. But it is certainly possible, from within any tradition broadly conceived, to be critical of par-
ticular practices, even long-standing ones. See WALZER, supra note 165. That possibility is enough
to create a conflict between Burkean and rationalist minimalists, and to make perfectionism, operat-
ing within a diverse and heterogeneous interpretive tradition, a feasible enterprise. See DWORKIN,
supra note 163.
180. See notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
181. See VERMEULE, supra note 66.
182. For different perspectives, see BREYER, supra note 13; SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION, supra note 15; VERMEULE, supra note 66; AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN
LAW (Sari Bashi trans., 2005).
183. See VERMEULE, supra note 66.
184. I am rejecting the view that a theory of legitimacy, or a claim about what interpretation
necessarily requires, can settle the underlying debates. See Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist
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What works well in one legal system, or in one time or place, may not
do so in another. In Nazi Germany, an emphasis on statutory purpose, and
on changing social values, may lead to horrifying results.85 In other times
and places, an emphasis on purpose and changing values might be tolerable
or even good. t1 6 Something similar is true for constitutional interpretation,
and it helps to illuminate the argument between Burkean minimalists and
their adversaries.
Having understood Burkean minimalism in pragmatic terms, I will now
attempt to make some progress toward specifying the conditions in which
Burkean minimalism can, in fact, be justified in those terms. A great deal
depends on an assessment of traditions and of the capacities of those who
reject them. But it should be clear that committed Burkeans might be skepti-
cal, at the outset, about any such consequentialist assessment, which
necessarily depends on evaluative judgments of the interpreter's own.
Burkeans would be tempted to ask: ought we not to trust our traditions as
such, rather than trusting ourselves, or our judges, to decide whether, and
when, traditions are trustworthy? It would be a plausible understanding of
Burke himself to suggest that the conditions for Burkeanism are simple:
When the tradition is long-standing, and has been accepted by many people,
it should not be abandoned, especially when those who wish to abandon it
have a great deal of power. It would even be possible to understand Burke in
terms that see the past as having a kind of direct authority, one whose force
has nothing to do with consequences at all.
8 7
I reject such positions for both politics and constitutional law. For poli-
tics, the problem is that tradition is often an insecure guide, and the
experience of those who have lived under bad traditions is often enough to
show that established practices need revision-and even enough to motivate
the development and use of a theory, certainly by citizens and their repre-
sentatives and (more rarely) by judges.' 8 For constitutional law, the problem
is that the process of adjudication, culminating in opinions by independent
judges, properly holds traditions to account-at least under constitutional
provisions that are best understood as critical, rather than celebratory, of
entrenched practices. The Equal Protection Clause is the best example here.
With respect to constitutional provisions of this kind, Burkeanism verges on
self-contradiction: the tradition, with respect to such provisions, is to engage
in criticism of traditional practices, and the criticism operates by reference
to at least some kind of theory.
I do not mean to suggest that with respect to the Equal Protection Clause,
a rejection of Burkeanism is logically compulsory. It would be possible to
Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 629 (2005). For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism
Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 636 (1999).
185. See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (Deborah
Lucas Schneider trans., 1991).
186. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
187. See Kronman, supra note 35.
188. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS (2004).
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find a tradition of opposition to racial discrimination, one that has operated
for many decades, and to see that opposition as exhausting the meaning of
the Clause. But if judges who are loosened from tradition-to ask questions
about (for example) discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orienta-
tion-are far from entirely unreliable or unmoored, and if the traditions
themselves are suspect, Burkeanism loses much of its appeal.
At this point committed Burkeans have an additional set of arguments.
They might object that any effort to specify the conditions for Burkeanism
in a way that allows judges to pick and choose is simply too opportunistic-
and that opportunistic Burkeanism is far worse than the real thing. This ob-
jection can be understood in two different ways. The first is pragmatic and
very much in the spirit of my general argument here: perhaps a rule in favor
of Burkeanism would be better than a more fine-grained approach, which
asks whether Burkeanism makes sense in particular domains. In my view,
this claim is wrong, but it cannot be defeated a priori; it must be evaluated
by reference to the results that it would produce.
The second understanding of this objection is conceptual and normative
rather than pragmatic. The claim would be that an approach to interpretation
must be genuinely principled. It cannot be defended or rejected by reference
to the results that it produces. Such a defense, or such a rejection, is indeed
too opportunistic, too result-oriented.
So understood, the objection is unhelpful and confused. To be sure, an
approach to interpretation has no appeal if it enables judges to do whatever
they want in particular cases. Such an approach would produce bad conse-
quences (including intolerable unpredictability). But no approach can be
defended on grounds that are indifferent to consequences; an approach is
unacceptable if it leads to (many) unacceptable results. This point holds for
Burkean minimalism as well as for the alternatives.
Let us now explore some details.
A. Originalists and Burkeans
1. Possible worlds. Burkeans reject originalism, but it is possible to
imagine a world in which originalism would be worth pursuing. Suppose,
for example, that the original public meaning of the document would gener-
ally or always produce sensible results in terms of both institutional
practices and individual rights; that violations of the original public meaning
would be unjust or otherwise unacceptable; that democratic judgments that
did not violate the original public meaning would almost always conform, at
the outset or fairly soon, to the proper understanding of human rights; and
that judges not following the original public meaning would produce terrible
blunders. In such a world, originalism would be the best approach to follow.
The reason is that by stipulation, originalism would impose a desirable dis-
cipline on the judiciary, preventing it from making serious errors, at the
same time that it would serve as a near-perfect safeguard against injustice,
rights violations, or otherwise unacceptable results. What could possibly be
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wrong with originalism in a world of this kind, or even in a world that is
close to it?
It follows that there is no abstract argument against originalism. If
originalism would produce the best results on balance,89 as compared with
the alternatives, the argument for originalism would be very powerful. 9° In
our world, the strongest objection to originalism is that it would greatly un-
settle existing rights and institutions, in a way that would make American
constitutional law much worse rather than better.'9'
Burkean minimalists reject originalism for that reason: they believe that
originalists are in the grip of an abstract theory, one that would do away
with a kind of inheritance.' That inheritance takes the form of numerous
judicial judgments over long periods of time, in which public commitments,
social learning, and desirable adaptation have occasionally led to constitu-
tional rulings that diverged from the original understanding. Minimalists,
Burkean and otherwise, typically contend that this process of evolution was
itself anticipated by the founding generation, which did not attempt to freeze
its particular views. 93 If this view is correct, Burkeans and originalists can
make common cause.
When Burkeans recoil at the suggestion that the founding document
should be understood to mean what it originally meant, they are embracing a
conception of the Constitution as evolving in the same way as traditions and
the common law-not through the idiosyncratic judgments of individual
judges, but through a process in which social norms and practices play the
key role. 194 It is in this vein that Justice Frankfurter contended, "It is an in-
admissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it
to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them.
' '195
Consider, for example, the question whether a congressional declaration
of war is a necessary precursor to the use of force by the president. On the
basis of the constitutional text, read in light of its history, there is a plausible
189. See Posting of Randy Barnett to Legal Affairs Debate Club, http://legalaffairs.org/
webexclusive/debateclub_cie05O5.msp (May 3, 2005, 1:43 PM) ("Given a sufficiently good consti-
tutional text, originalists maintain that better results will be reached overall if government
officials-including judges-must stick to the original meaning rather than empowering them to
trump that meaning with one that they prefer.") (emphasis added).
190. This is one way of reading the argument in SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 15.
191. I am putting to one side conceptual challenges to originalism. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
192. See Merrill, supra note 33, at 518-19.
193. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Judge John G. Roberts,
Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States); see also BREYER, supra note 13. As a matter
of history, this claim is disputable. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003).
194. See LEVI, supra note 74, at 2-6.




argument to this effect. 96 The argument is controversial,' 97 but let us stipu-
late that on the original understanding, the president may not use force
without a congressional declaration of war. On Burkean grounds, judicial
insistence on this idea runs into a serious problem: since the founding, the
United States has been involved in over two hundred armed conflicts, and
Congress has declared war on only five occasions.'98 Long-standing prac-
tices are inconsistent with the original understanding, and Burkeans insist
that those practices must operate as a "gloss" on the document.' 99
At a minimum, Burkeans will notice that a congressional authorization
to use force has operated as the functional equivalent of a declaration of war,
and they will contend that such an authorization gives the president the same
power that is accorded him or her by a declaration. °° But Burkeans will add
that if the president has often gone to war with neither a declaration nor an
authorization, constitutional law must give some attention to that fact-and
at least consider the possibility that for some military actions, congressional
authorization is not required at all. The example could easily be extended to
many cases in which social practices and judicial decisions have outrun the
original understanding. For example, defenders of foreign surveillance by
the president might argue in just this way, at least if the tradition, when
• •• 201
properly characterized, really is long-standing.
2. Originalist rejoinders. To their Burkean adversaries, originalists have
two possible responses. First, they might accept the claims of stare decisis
and social traditions and acknowledge that much of the time, established
doctrines and practices must be accepted, whatever the content of the origi-
nal understanding. Justice Scalia has described himself as a "faint-hearted"
originalist; 2°2 his faint-heartedness consists in his unwillingness to use the
original understanding as a kind of all-purpose weapon against existing law
and practices. On this count, Justice Scalia is very different from Justice
Thomas, who is not so faint of heart. Justice Scalia has said that Justice
• ,,201
Thomas "doesn't believe in stare decisis, period. Justice Scalia remarks,
196. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIET-
NAM (1993). But see Yoo, supra note 73.
197. See Yoo, supra note 73.
198. Id.
199. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted
by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 151, 160-61 (2006) (arguing that "where both
houses of Congress and the President pass a law which is untraditional, but within the scope of the
original meaning of the Constitution ... the federal courts ought to uphold the law based on the
Constitution's original meaning" and especially "where the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment have determined that the reliance interests generated by tradition are outweighed by the
harm that complying with tradition" would incur).
200. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047 (2005).
201. See supra notes 9, 160 and accompanying text.
202. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 15, at 864.
203. Stephen B. Presser, Touting Thomas, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 68.
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"if a constitutional line of authority is wrong, [Justice Thomas] would say
'Let's get it right.' I wouldn't do that."
2
04
The line between Burkean minimalism and faint-hearted originalism
might well turn out to be thin in practice. The question is under exactly what
conditions originalists will prove faint of heart. The answer turns on the
weight to be given to precedents and practices. If originalists are extremely
faint-hearted, they will usually agree with their Burkean counterparts. In-
deed, they might even become Burkeans.
As an example, consider the question whether originalists should over-
turn Brown v. Board of Education2 or Reynolds v. Sims2 0 if it turns out that
the ban on racial segregation or the one-person, one-vote rule cannot be de-
fended by reference to the original understanding. A faint-hearted originalist
might believe that a decision to overrule either of these decisions would be a
kind of revolution-one that would violate entrenched understandings,
jeopardize the fabric of existing law, and have unanticipated bad conse-
quences. If those who are faint of heart emphasize these points, they show
strong Burkean impulses. The task for faint-hearted originalists is to specify
exactly when, and why, they are willing to live with decisions that were
originally illegitimate under their preferred theory.
The second response, offered by oiginalists to Burkean minimalists, is
far more interesting. Oiginalists might well claim that the doctrines to
which they most strenuously object are not, in fact, a product of slowly
evolving judgments, firmly rooted in social practices and generally fitting
the Burkean model of constitutional change. On this view, presidential
power to make war or to engage in foreign surveillance may well be legiti-
mate, if either is actually rooted in decisions extending over time; but
judicial invention of baseless constitutional rights is not. Speaking in
Burkean tones, originalists might argue that the most objectionable doc-
trines are a product of a kind of (French?) revolution, in which the Supreme
Court, above all under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was cap-
tured by a theory that was at once contentious and radical.0 7 Of course Roe
v. Wade is a particular target of oiginalist ire, but the right of privacy is gen-
erally objectionable on oiginalist grounds, and the one-person, one-vote
rule is vulnerable as well, as are judge-made doctrines requiring a rigid
separation of church and state. 2°'
It may be that in its most objectionable decisions, the Court was paying
insufficient attention to social practices, which it repeatedly rejected. Per-
haps its own reasoning was, in the end, a priori, and not securely rooted in
either precedent or practice. z 9 It is not at all clear that committed Burkeans
204. Id. at 69.
205. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
206. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
207. A counterargument can be found in Strauss, supra note 25.
208. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
209. But see Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
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must or should treat such a revolution as the established backdrop for consti-
tutional law-just as it is not clear that after an illegitimate revolution, a
Burkean polity should build on the revolution, rather than attempting a kind
of restoration.
3. Contexts. I have noted that both Justices Frankfurter and O'Connor
can be characterized as Burkean minimalists, but it is here that there are
noteworthy differences between the two, stemming from the dramatically
different contexts in which they sat on the Supreme Court. Often a Democ-
ratic Burkean, Justice Frankfurter typically invoked Burkean arguments as a
shield for government's use in the face of constitutional challenge. Sitting at
the inception of the Warren Court, Justice Frankfurter insisted that social
practices deserved respect, and his form of Burkean minimalism raised a
series of cautionary notes about the liberal initiatives of that Court, which he
often rejected. ° For Justice O'Connor, sitting long after the Warren Court,
Burkean minimalism operated to insulate those initiatives from significant
• • 211
or immediate revision. This difference raises a number of questions about
the appropriately Burkean response to a non-Burkean, or an anti-Burkean,
period in constitutional history.
On one view, the essential fallacy of a Burkean understanding of con-
temporary constitutional law is that it creates a ratchet effect, in which
Burkeans end up having to "conserve" the aggressive and tradition-rejecting
decisions of their liberal predecessors. Compare the question whether the
Supreme Court, in the late 1930s, should have taken a Burkean approach to
the body of doctrine that emerged from the Lochner era, including protec-
tion of freedom of contract"' and restrictions on national power under the
213
commerce clause. When the Court has built up a body of doctrine that is
constitutionally unmoored, and has done so in a relatively short period, per-
haps any effort at conservation is not properly characterized as Burkean at
all. Perhaps the Court's post-New Deal rejection of Lochner era decisions,
in sweeping rulings not easily regarded as minimalist,214 can be understood
as a plausibly Burkean effort to return to traditions after a period character-
ized by an illegitimate judicial role (or rule)." Of course those Burkeans
210. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
211. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey of course
preserved Roe v. Wade, a decision of the Burger Court rather than the Warren Court; but Roe is ap-
propriately placed within the general line of doctrine that the Warren Court inaugurated. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
212. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923).
213. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
214. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage
legislation against Due Process Clause challenge); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act against Commerce Clause challenge).
215. For a very different view, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991) (arguing that the New Deal period should be regarded as a constitutional moment, not as a
return to any tradition).
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who emphasize judicial judgments might well wonder whether the Court
was right to sweep away its Lochner era decisions so abruptly. But if those
decisions lack legitimacy, Burkean or otherwise, the decision to sweep
might be right.
If this point is correct, Burkeans might well accept the Court's wholesale
rejection of much of its jurisprudence between 1905 and 1935.216 And if this
is so, it would be possible to think that on Burkean grounds, Justice Frank-
furter was right in his insistence on stability but that Justice O'Connor was
wrong in hers. To be sure, the illegitimate decisions might deserve respect if
that respect is necessary to protect established expectations or to insure
against a large-scale social upheaval. But on Burkean grounds, there is no
reason for a presumption on behalf of illegitimacy, even if it has persisted
for decades.
I believe that a dispute on these questions helps to illuminate the divi-
sion between contemporary Burkean minimalists, most notably Justice
O'Connor, and the less faint-hearted originalists, most notably Justice Tho-
mas. Burkean minimalists would be most unlikely to have joined all of the
controversial decisions of the Warren Court, but they might now be willing
to accept some or even most of them in the interest of stability. The argu-
ment for doing so is strengthened if those controversial decisions can indeed
be seen to have emerged from an acceptably Burkean process of case-by-
case evolution, closely attentive to social norms and practices." ' On that
count, originalists are skeptical.
In this dispute, the strongest Burkean point against originalism involves
the risks associated with wholesale disruption of contemporary constitu-
tional law, containing understandings of rights and institutions on which
many Americans have come to rely. In the domain of governmental institu-
tions, the Court's validation of independent regulatory agencies is the
simplest example.218 A dramatic departure, striking down the independence
of such agencies, would unsettle much of American government, including
such institutions as the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Com-
munications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission."' There are prominent examples in the domain
of rights as well, including the rule of one-person, one-vote 22 and the prohi-
bition on school prayer.22' A decision to revisit these rulings would threaten
deeply entrenched features of American constitutional doctrine. Many of the
rights-protecting decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, notwithstand-
ing their dubious Burkean roots, have now become embedded in national
216. See supra note 214.
217. See Strauss, supra note 25.
218. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
219. It would be possible, of course, for a minimalist to favor modest steps in the direction of
greater presidential control. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Ad-
ministration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
220. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
221. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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life as a social matter,122 though it is certainly true that the same cannot be
221
said of all such decisions. Many such decisions are embedded not merely
in national life but also in constitutional doctrine, in the sense that they can-
not be rethought without making it necessary to rethink numerous other
decisions as well.
B. Perfectionists and Burkeans
Perfectionists believe that it is appropriate for federal judges to cast con-
224
stitutional ideals in the best constructive light. Of course they do not
believe that judges can legitimately create the Constitution anew; their job
involves interpretation, not rewriting. Hence judges owe a duty of fidelity to
text, precedent, and all other relevant sources of law. But to the extent that
fidelity permits, judges are entitled and even required to develop a principle
that best justifies an area of law. 225 If, for example, the most property-
protective view of the Takings Clause226 puts that clause in its best construc-
tive light, perfectionists believe that the Court should adopt that view, except
to the extent that it is in palpable tension with existing doctrine. If a de-
mocracy-centered understanding of the First Amendment makes best sense
of the free speech guarantee,"' then the Court should adopt that understand-
ing to the extent that it can be made to fit with existing law.
Burkeans distrust abstract or a priori reasoning, and hence they will be
deeply skeptical of any approach of this sort. They think that particular peo-
ple-judges!-must decide what puts law in the best constructive light, and
229they are skeptical of judges' decisions. Indeed, Burkean minimalists
222. See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2006) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 13).
223. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is the most obvious source of controversy here.
224. The applicable theory can be found in DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 39, at
49-74, and DWORKIN, supra note 163. I put to one side the many complexities in Dworkin's ac-
count.
225. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 39, at 49-74.
226. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
227. Of course, there are hard questions about how courts should "trade off" fit and justifica-
tion-as, for example, by selecting (among the reasonable alternatives) an approach that does
somewhat less well along the dimension of fit but better along the dimension of justification.
228. See BREYER, supra note 13; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
229. The best perfectionist response is this: Inevitably, judges have to make decisions. Their
decisions will have to cast existing law in the best constructive light, one way or the other. Burkean
approaches must themselves fit and justify existing law, and if judges cannot be trusted, why should
we trust judges who choose Burkean minimalism? Furthermore, why should we trust judges to
choose it in the first place? Perfectionists are right to say that any theory of interpretation, or ap-
proach to interpretation, must be chosen by judges; there is no avoiding that. But perfectionists
should acknowledge that judges might choose a theory, or an approach, that is attuned to judicial
fallibility. Originalists want to reduce the discretion of judges, and they might claim that their own
approach puts constitutional law in the best constructive light. Burkeans can make the same claim.
As noted in the text, Burkean minimalism must, in the end, be defended on perfectionist grounds.
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might, and probably must, be willing to defend their own approach on the
ground that Burkean minimalism both fits and justifies our practices, and
hence defeats perfectionism under its own criteria. On this view, Burkean
minimalism can be understood as a kind of second-order perfectionism-
that is, a form of perfectionism that is alert to the institutional weaknesses of
the federal judiciary, and that therefore refuses to pursue perfectionism di-
rectly. That very refusal may help to perfect constitutional democracy,
because it minimizes the theory-building demands on the federal judiciary.
Second-order perfectionism is, in fact, a good understanding of the prag-
matic nature of Burkean minimalism.
It may well be true that in order to be defended, any approach to consti-
tutional law must ultimately fit and justify our practices."3 But it may also
be true that in view of the limitations of federal courts, particularly in the
domain of moral and political argument, judges do best if they defer to tra-
ditions, rather than attempt to evaluate the traditions on their own. As I have
suggested, Burkean minimalism reflects a kind of delegation principle, in
which judges grant law-interpreting authority not to regulatory agencies," '
but to long-standing practices and judgments (including judicial judgments).
An idea of this kind lies close to the heart of Burke's own view, incorporat-
ing his suggestion that if reason and wisdom are the goals, the best way to
achieve them is to avoid a priori thinking and to defer to traditions, even
those taken by rationalists to reflect prejudices.232
Certainly the argument for (first-order) perfectionism, and the attack on
Burkeanism, would be strengthened if we were entitled to have real confi-
dence in the theory-building capacities of federal judges.21' This claim might
draw strength from the observation that in an important sense, current gen-
erations are more experienced than past generations, with a greater stock of
knowledge, 234 and current judges are a part of current generations. Even if
current judges are able theorists, the argument is not airtight. Democratic
skeptics might object that judicial perfection of constitutional ideals would
235threaten the right to self-government. Perhaps that concern could be ac-
commodated through the right theory of interpretation, which would, by
236hypothesis, give self-government its due. Burkean skeptics might also
The approach must reflect an appreciation of the federal judiciary's weaknesses in theory-building,
and pay proper attention to the value of stability.
230. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 39, at 49-74. Questions might be raised
about whether the best accounts must fit and justify our practices, rather than be best on independent
grounds; but an approach that claims to be best, without claiming to fit and justify, is unlikely to
count as interpretation at all.
231. A delegation of sorts underlies Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (calling for judicial deference to agency interpretations of law).
232. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
233. As Dworkin plainly does. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 39, at 49-74.
234. See infra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
235. See ELY, supra note 28; see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (rejecting Roe v. Wade).
236. See ELY, supra note 28; Ely, supra note 235.
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worry that perfectionists would encounter serious pragmatic problems. By
attempting to engraft their preferred theories onto actual societies, judicial
efforts might turn out to be futile or counterproductive, if only because so-
cieties would resist those efforts. 23' But if a theory that fits our practices is
indeed appealing in principle, and if courts can elaborate and implement it,
perhaps they should do so.2 38
Some people do not take this possibility seriously. They believe, for ex-
ample, that a perfectionist approach is forbidden by the very idea of
. . .• ,,239
"interpretation, or that considerations of legitimacy are by themselves
sufficient to rule perfectionism out of bounds.240 But I have emphasized that
the Constitution does not set out the instructions for its own interpretation,
and so long as the Court is respecting the text, which is after all what has
been ratified, many different approaches fit within the boundaries set by the
general idea of interpretation. Among the plausible possibilities, a great deal
depends on judgments about institutional capacities.' It should be obvious
that the argument for theoretical ambition from the federal judiciary would
be strengthened if there were reason to trust not only the good will but also
the capacities of theoretically ambitious judges.
It is here, of course, that Burkean minimalists break from perfectionists.
Burkean minimalists notice that highly reasonable people will disagree
about what casts constitutional provisions in the best constructive light. Be-
cause they are Burkeans, these minimalists distrust theoretical ambition as
such. They are most unlikely to have confidence in judges having great
theoretical ambitions; in the Burkean view, such judges suffer from hubris.
To the extent that judges are entrusted with power, Burkeans believe, it is
because of their willingness and ability to elaborate the Constitution's text,
read in light of society's traditions and practices. Whether the theorists are
concerned to vindicate property rights, or a democratic conception of the
free speech principle, or the abstract ideal of color blindness, or a particular
conception of the separation of powers, the Burkean minimalist firmly op-
242poses them. The opposition is based on the belief that perfectionism,
unpromising even in the political domain, is a most unlikely foundation for
judicial judgment.
237. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
238. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 39, at 49-74.
239. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 184 (contending that the task of interpretation necessarily is
intentionalist).
240. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
241. See VERMEULE, supra note 66.
242. This point helps to explain Justice O'Connor's crucial vote to uphold the affirmative
action program at the University of Michigan Law School: the abstract theory of color-blindness
was not permitted to operate to defeat programs that had been defended not only by universities, but
by the military and American business as well. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31
(2003), and in particular the notably Burkean suggestion that the benefits of affirmative action "are
not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." Id. at 330.
(Vol. 105:353
Burkean Minimalism
C. Burkeans, Rationalists, and "the Wisdom of the Cradle":
Are We the Ancients?
Suppose that we are trying to decide between the two forms of minimal-
ism: Burkean and rationalist. On what assumptions should we choose the
former? Much of the answer depends on whether we agree with Burke. If
established traditions reflect wisdom rather than accident and force,
Burkean minimalism gains force. Perhaps a state wants to ban obscene ma-
terial. Perhaps speakers object that existing constitutional doctrine can be
understood to establish a principle of individual autonomy, one that does not
permit government to ban adults from reading and viewing whatever they
want. 24 If we believe that the traditional practices that support the ban are
likely to embody wisdom, we might want courts to uphold it, whatever the
ideal of individual autonomy seems to require.
In the same vein, Burkeans would want the Court to permit "ceremonial
deism,' '244 in the form of public recognition of God. When a constitutional
challenge is raised against ceremonial deism, Burkeans reject the challenge
largely by reference to traditions. 245 The same analysis would suggest that
when initially confronted with the issue, courts should have permitted devia-
246tions from the one-person, one-vote rule. Burkean minimalists want courts
to try to avoid the "political thicket," not because they believe in judicial
abstinence as such, but because they think that established practices of po-
litical representation deserve respect even if it is not easy to produce a
theory to defend them. Speaking of morality generally, ethicist Leon Kass
contends that in some domains, "we intuit and feel, immediately and with-
out argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear." 7 For
those who believe that judges ought not to challenge what "we intuit and
feel, immediately and without argument," Burkean minimalism has consid-
erable appeal. 24' Recall Burke's enthusiasm for prejudice, an enthusiasm that
249fits well with Kass's suggestion that repugnance can be wise.
By contrast, rationalist minimalists are highly skeptical of prejudices.
They are willing to listen to the claim that, in some domains, the Court
ought to scrutinize traditions and should be willing to generalize, from its
own precedents, principles that operate as a sharp constraint on government.
As we have seen, the ban on sex discrimination emerged from this process
243. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
244. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084-87 (1996).
245. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-96 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 716 (1984).
246. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
247. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE
ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 3, 19 (1998); see also Hayek, supra note 97.
248. For doubts about Kass's argument in the domain of morality and politics, see Sunstein,
supra note 88, at 539.
249. See Kass, supra note 247.
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of generalization."O In that context in particular, it is difficult to defend the
view that long-standing practices reflected wisdom and sense rather than
power and oppression. Some theories of the Establishment Clause have pro-
duced sharp critiques of long-standing practices, based as they are on
accounts of neutrality that jeopardize a number of traditions. 25 ' Rationalist
minimalists are willing to impose fresh barriers in this way, and they are at
least equally comfortable with permitting the government to develop new
accounts of what it can legitimately do-accounts that might produce con-
siderable novelty in the form, for example, of an expanded conception of the
police power. 11
Justice Holmes can be seen as an originator of a Burkean approach to
the Due Process Clause, but he was far more pragmatist than Burkean: "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply per-
sists from blind imitation of the past.' 253 In his Lochner dissent, Holmes
insisted that "the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and famil-
iar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
the United States. 2 14 Holmes's key point, a deeply anti-Burkean one, is that
whether we find opinions "natural and familiar" is itself an "accident" of
our time and place. There could be no clearer rejection of Burke's sugges-
tion that our "prejudices" are a reflection not of accident but of hard-won
255
wisdom. Of course a rejoinder might be that on pragmatic grounds, there
is much to be said on behalf of practices that have endured. But Holmes had
little sympathy for this argument.
The Federalist No. 1, with its explicit preference for "reflection and
choice" over "accident and force," offers a similar challenge to Burkean-
ism.216 Consider too the words of James Madison, writing in a very young
America:
Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid a
decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have
not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their
own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?2
7
250. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
251. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
253. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
254. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
255. This point is a frontal assault against the claims on behalf of the constitutive role of
traditions in Kronman, supra note 35.
256. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 3, at 1.
257. Id. No. 14 (James Madison), at 72.
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In Madison's unmistakably anti-Burkean account, Americans "accom-
plished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society.
They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of
the globe."2 '
These are largely rhetorical passages, but there is actually an argument
in the background, one that turns Burkeanism on its head. Thomas Jefferson
captured that argument with his objection that some people "ascribe to the
men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human," and his response
that the age of the founders "was very like the present, but without the ex-
perience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is
worth a century of book-reading."2 9 Jefferson is contending that current
generations have more experience than past generations; in that sense, they
have lived longer. Burkeans tend to cherish the wisdom of those long dead,
but their stock of wisdom was far more limited than ours. In the same vein,
Pascal contended that we are the ancients: "Those whom we call ancient
were really new in all things, and properly constituted the infancy of man-
kind; and as we have joined to their knowledge the experience of the
centuries which have followed them, it is in ourselves that we should find
this antiquity that we revere in others.'' 6
Jeremy Bentham attacked ancient wisdom in identical terms, contending
that those who were ancient were, in the relevant sense, very young.26' Ben-
tham acknowledged that old people have more experience than young
people, but insisted that "as between generation and generation, the reverse
of this is true. 262 In fact, "the wisdom of the times called old" is "the wis-
dom of the cradle., 263 Bentham deplored the "reigning prejudice in favor of
the dead,"264 and also the tendency to disparage the present generation,
which has a greater stock of knowledge than "untaught, inexperienced gen-
,,261
erations.
These arguments turn chronology directly against Burke, not by attempt-
ing to vindicate a priori reason, but by suggesting that if experience is our
guide, the present has large advantages over the past. This point helps sup-
port the idea that Burkeanism should not be used as a sword against
government: if current generations would like to reject traditions, they
should be permitted to do exactly that, because they have more experience.
A similar idea might be found in the Court's Pascalian suggestion that what
258. Id.
259. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 559 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). Note, however, that Jefferson is
speaking of experience, not of a priori reasoning (or "book-reading").
260. Blaise Pascal, Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum, in THOUGHTS, LETTERS, AND MINOR
WORKS 444, 449 (Charles W. Eliot ed., M.L. Booth et al. trans., 1910).
261. BENTHAM, supra note 4, at 43-53.
262. Id. at 44.
263. Id. at 45.
264. Id.
265. id. at 47.
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is crucial is not ancient practice, but an "emerging awareness."'266 This sug-
gestion stresses the judgments of current generations, which are presented
as more informed and reflective than those of the distant past.
But if their focus is on the Supreme Court, Burkean minimalists need
not insist that respect for long-standing traditions always makes sense in
the political domain. Addressing courts in particular, Burkean minimalists
might plead agnosticism on the proper treatment of traditions in democ-
ratic processes, and contend more modestly that their approach is
distinctly well-adapted to the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the
federal judiciary. For judges, the question is an insistently comparative
one. It is not whether traditions are good, or great, in the abstract. It is
whether tradition-tethered judges are better than judges who think that
they ought to subject traditions to critical scrutiny. Burkean minimalists
believe that traditions are the best available guide, at least when judges are
asked to invalidate legislation.
A committed Burkean might reject these qualifications, or any effort to
think through the circumstances in which Burkeanism makes the most
sense. To the committed Burkean, the analysis is simple: if a practice has
persisted for a long period, it is entitled to respect, unless circumstances are
shown to have changed or the proposed changes themselves build on experi-
ence. For the most consistent Burkeans, any effort to evaluate circumstances
threatens to depend on a priori reason, which is unreliable.
But the more ambivalent Burkean, alert to Pascal's challenge and aware
of Jefferson's words, would seek to identify the conditions under which
Burkean minimalism is the best approach to constitutional law. Suppose,
first, that originalism would produce intolerable results, in part because it
would be too destabilizing. Suppose, second, that we have reason to distrust
the theory-building capacities of judges, so that perfectionism is out of
bounds. Suppose finally that, in general or in particular areas, traditions and
established practices are more reliable than the results that would be pro-
duced by minimalists who are willing to evaluate those traditions and
practices by their own light. When these conditions are met, the argument
for Burkean minimalism has considerable force.
The contest between Burkean minimalism and its rationalist sibling is
much closer. Under some constitutional provisions, above all the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Burkean approach is hard or perhaps impossible to
square with entrenched understandings in American constitutional law-and
hence turns out to be self-contradictory. The reason is that some areas of
doctrine have long operated on non-Burkean or even anti-Burkean premises.
A form of rationalism, allowing and even welcoming challenges to certain
forms of discrimination, has become part of the fabric of constitutional
267law. An even more serious problem is that for some forms of discrimina-
266. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); see also supra note 139.
267. Indeed, rational basis review, allowing all traditions to be called to account, is an impor-
tant piece of that fabric, though admittedly such review almost always results in validation. See, e.g.,
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding mandatory retirement law as rational).
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tion it is exceedingly difficult to argue that long-standing traditions reflect
wisdom, rather than power and injustice. Here the argument for a form of
rationalism, subjecting traditions to critical scrutiny, is quite powerful. In
this context, Burke's celebration of "prejudice" makes no sense, and use of
the word seems to be a stupid or cruel joke.
But in other domains, the Burkean approach can claim both to be consis-
tent with existing law and to operate in a way that imposes appropriate
discipline on judicial judgments. In the areas of separation of powers and
national security, for example, Burkean minimalism deserves to have, and
indeed has had, a major role, as the Court has proceeded via small steps and
261
with close attention to institutional practices extending over time. If Con-
gress and President Bush have settled on certain accommodations, there is
reason to believe that those accommodations make institutional sense. Jus-
tice Frankfurter offered the clearest statement of the Burkean position, with
his suggestion that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pur-
sued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution
... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the Presi-
dent.' 26 In the particular context of national security, Pascal's challenge,
emphasizing social learning over time, is least likely to support an aggres-
sive judicial role against the elected branches, simply because this is a
domain in which judicial expertise is unlikely.7
A highly controversial application of this claim would be a suggestion
that the president does indeed have the inherent power to engage in foreign
surveillance-ensuring that he may do so as long as Congress has not said
otherwise, and perhaps raising the possibility that he may do so even if
Congress requires him to follow a specified procedure."' Without engaging
the complex questions on their merits, let us simply stipulate that the presi-
dent has long engaged in such surveillance and that it is not simple to find a
constitutional provision giving him the "inherent" power to do so.272 If this is
so, the legal question is whether the long-standing practice legitimately pro-
duces a "gloss" on Article II, permitting the president to engage in the
relevant conduct, certainly in the face of congressional silence and perhaps
even overriding congressional will. This is not a simple question to answer,
268. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For lower court decisions in the same vein from
various stages in recent history, see, for example, Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242
E3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001); Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
269. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
270. Note that Frankfurter's argument is not a plea for general judicial deference to the Presi-
dent; more cautiously, it emphasizes the argument for deference when a long-standing practice is at
issue.
271. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-13 (2000).
272. The strongest textual grounds would invoke the Commander-in-Chief Clause and the
vesting of "executive" power in the president.
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and for that reason the Burkean minimalist would want to avoid it. Such a
minimalist would seek, to the extent possible, to understand existing legisla-
tion in a way that conforms to the President's claim of a "gloss.
2 73
I do not mean to offer a particular answer here. Perhaps existing legis-
lation must be understood to override the President's claim of constitutional
power. No general approach can resolve concrete cases. But whatever the
best resolution of any particular controversy, a Burkean approach to such
questions deserves respectful consideration, above all when the stakes are
high and courts lack relevant information.
D. The Burkean Dilemma
As I have suggested, Burkean minimalism is likely to run into serious
problems whenever the legal system has operated for a significant period on
premises that Burkeans would reject. If an area of the law has been devel-
oped on perfectionist grounds, Burkeans might be tempted to abandon it,
perhaps immediately; so too if rationalist minimalism has dominated a par-
ticular area of the law. But even more than most, Burkean minimalists
respect the demands of stare decisis, believing as they do that entrenched
decisions may well embody wisdom and that new departures are likely to
have unanticipated adverse consequences, especially if existing law is em-
bodied in social practices as well as judicial doctrines. As I have noted,
Burkeanism might even risk self-contradiction insofar as it confronts an area
of law that has long operated on non-Burkean grounds.
Burkean minimalists have no simple way out of this dilemma.275 It is cer-
tainly reasonable for Burkeans to conclude that their best option is to respect
the existing decisions but to attempt to confine them, refusing to extend rul-
276ings that fall within the camp of perfectionism or rationalist minimalism.
On this view, courts should not build on decisions lacking roots in long-
standing traditions-they should narrow them without overruling them. It is
easy to see how Burkeans might be drawn to this way of dealing with Roe v.
Wade. 277 But it would not be out of bounds for Burkeans to conclude that the
most indefensible departures from their preferred method must be sharply
cabined or even overruled, at least if it is possible to do so without disrupt-
273. Arguments to this effect can be found in Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President 7
(Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj0I1906.pdf (urging, among other things,
that the constitutional questions should be avoided by interpreting relevant legislation so as to allow
the President to engage in foreign surveillance). It is not clear, however, if this argument gives suffi-
cient attention, or weight, to the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. See 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 (2000).
274. After the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), any
defense of the warrantless wiretapping program faces serious obstacles. See Sunstein, supra note 46.
275. It will be noticed that this dilemma replicates the problem that originalists encounter
when asked to respect the legacy of the Warren Court.
276. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707 (1997), is an example.
277. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ing reasonable expectations or undoing a great deal of the fabric of existing
law. Committed Burkeans might well take this approach to Roe. On this
count, rationalist minimalists are very different, tending to take Roe as es-
tablished doctrine, even if they believe that it originally overreached.278
These points help to illuminate a possible internal debate, among those
with Burkean sympathies, about the proper approach to Roe. No Burkean is
likely to believe that Roe was correct in the first instance; the best arguments
for the Court's decision are perfectionist, emphasizing sex equality or per-
sonal autonomy with respect to certain kinds of decisions.7 Skeptical of
perfectionism, Burkeans are reluctant to accept those arguments. To the ex-
tent that they see Roe as an illegitimate departure from their approach, they
might be willing to overrule it insofar as they could do so without undoing
the fabric of current law or creating a kind of social upheaval. Democratic
Burkeans would be especially comfortable with this route.
Other Burkeans might believe, not implausibly, that Roe has become
embedded not merely in constitutional doctrine but also in social practices,
and that a decision to overrule it, especially in the name of some kind of
theory, would be too destabilizing. Consider here the Court's refusal to over-
rule Miranda-a decision evidently based on Burkean grounds, seeing the
280
Miranda warnings as ingrained in the legal culture. On Burkean premises,
one can easily imagine reasonable disagreements on the question of whether
to overrule Roe. Rationalist minimalists, ambivalent about both Roe as
originally written and Burke, would be less likely to favor overruling the
decision.
Many of the most vigorous disputes in contemporary constitutional law
involve the proper resolution of this kind of dilemma.2 ' Recall that a similar
dilemma can be found in the aftermath of the Lochner era, in which the
Court did not take a minimalist path, but on the contrary issued ambitious
282
rulings that abruptly did away with decades of decisions . If these ambi-
tious rulings were justified on Burkean grounds or otherwise, it was because
of the absence of any legitimate basis for the decisions that preceded
them-an especially severe problem in light of the fact that the decisions
213
imposed serious obstacles to democratic initiatives.
278. See Ginsburg, supra note 68, at 379-82 (1985) (criticizing Roe for deciding too much
too soon).
279. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989).
280. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
281. The most obvious example involves abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Other examples include Congress' power under the commerce clause, see
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); the right to bear arms, see Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); the "unitary executive," see Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541
(1994); the scope of the Establishment Clause, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); and the
reach of substantive due process, see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707.
282. See supra notes 212-215.




If the decisions of the New Deal and Warren Courts deserve to be treated
with more respect, it is because many of those decisions protect democratic
prerogatives, and because many others have a strong claim to legitimacy,
not least because they did not come as bolts from the blue. Perhaps the
Court's rulings could claim a foundation in a legitimate but non-Burkean
approach of one or another sort, calling for judicial deference to political
judgments28 or for a democracy-reinforcing approach to judicial review.286
Perhaps the Court's rulings were sufficiently rooted in prevailing social
commitments or in ordinary processes of case-by-case judgment; perhaps
many or most of them were minimalist, or minimalist enough. 21' A final as-
sessment of the question of legitimacy must depend on the merits, whose
resolution is not my purpose here. But in the end, an adequate way out of
the Burkean dilemma cannot avoid making some such assessment.
E. Unfinished Business
There are three more general issues in the background, and it is now
time to bring them into the foreground. The first involves the foundations of
Burkeanism; the second involves the grounds for specifying its domain; and
the third involves the relationship between Burkeanism and shallowness.
1. Burkean foundations. As I have developed it here, Burkeanism does
not rest on a belief that the past has any kind of inherent authority, or on a
judgment that people owe some kind of duty to the past, or the notion that
we are in some way constituted by our tradition (a claim at once true and
vacuous). Burkeanism is best justified in pragmatic terms, on the ground
that it is likely to lead to better results than the imaginable alternatives. But
what can be said against pragmatism can be said here as well: it is necessary
to offer some account by which to understand results as good or bad, and by
2881itself, pragmatism cannot supply that account. It is hard to see how prag-
matists can be pragmatists all the way down, because they need some kind
of account of the good or the right in order to decide what outcomes make
pragmatic sense. So, too, it is hard to see how Burkeans can be Burkeans all
the way down, in the sense that they need some evaluative standard, if only
a very vague one, by which to know that traditions are good. Traditions can-
not easily be said to be good simply because they are traditions. (Would
Burkeanism make sense for a nation that has experienced decades, or centu-
284. See Strauss, supra note 25.
285. See Thayer, supra note 113. Thayer's plea for judicial deference helps to support some of
the Court's New Deal rulings, including United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935).
286. See ELY, supra note 28, offering a democracy-reinforcing account that seems to support
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
without also supporting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
287. See Strauss, supra note 25.
288. See DWORKIN, supra note 39.
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ries, of injustice and oppression? Would Burkeanism, or Burkean minimal-
ism, make sense for contemporary Iraq, Iran, and Cuba?)
Pragmatic Burkeans have several possibleresponses. They might believe
that Burkeanism makes the most sense only for generally well-functioning
democratic regimes, such as those in the United States, France, and Eng-
land. They might claim that the foundation for their own approach is (say)
utilitarian, and that Burkeanism is the best way of promoting utilitarian
goals. Alternatively, they might say that the foundation of their own view is
less sectarian, in the sense that it attempts not to take a stand on the deepest
philosophical questions. They might be inclined to embrace a form of con-
sequentialism that sees rights violations as part of what must be counted in
219the assessment of consequences.
For purposes of evaluating Burkean minimalism in constitutional law,
the need for commitment to any kind of foundational approach is dimin-
ished if we attend to the theory-building weaknesses of the federal judiciary.
In light of those weaknesses, it might be possible to obtain an incompletely
theorized agreement in favor of Burkeanism, at least in some domains-that
is, an agreement in favor of Burkeanism amidst competing foundational
views, or uncertainty about which of those views is correct. Perhaps
Burkean minimalism can be accepted by those with highly disparate founda-
tional accounts. But much more work needs to be done on this question.
2. Burkean domains. The second bit of unfinished business involves the
specification of the domains in which Burkean minimalism makes sense.
The analysis here has been inductive and impressionistic, with equal protec-
tion and separation of powers being taken as the polar cases. It would be
much better to have a general account of when the grounds for Burkeanism
are most likely to be satisfied, and to try to bring that account to bear on
particular cases. As a first approximation, we might notice that Burkeanism
seems most appealing when traditions have been accepted by many inde-
pendent minds. If so, we might be inclined to ask whether the relevant
tradition does, in fact, reflect the independent judgments of many people, or
whether it is likely to reflect instead a cascade, in which most people simply
followed the initial practice. Or perhaps the tradition is a product not of
many independent people but some kind of injustice and coercion-a kind
of imposition from above, rather than a genuinely shared practice.
With an approach of this kind, it might be possible to offer a better ex-
planation of why the Equal Protection Clause, and perhaps the free speech
principle as well, should not be understood in Burkean terms. For one thing,
practices of discrimination on the basis of race and sex certainly do not re-
flect the independent judgments of those subject to discrimination. Often
African-Americans and women rejected those very practices. To the extent
that they were willing to accept them, there is good reason to think that their
289. See Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1982); Amartya Sen,
Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CI. L. REV. 1035, 1037-42 (1996).
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actions and even their beliefs were adaptive to an unjust status quo.2'9 If so,
the foundations for Burkeanism are absent.
Freedom of speech can be seen as a precondition for faith in traditions.
If people are not allowed to say what they think, then the independent judg-
ments that support traditions are much less likely to be found. At least with
respect to political issues, then, it would be odd to say that a nation should
allow suppression of speech if it has long allowed suppression of speech. An
entrenched practice of censorship cannot easily provide its own foundations.
Return in this light to the three cases with which this Article began. The
easiest one involves the status of independent agencies. Such agencies have
existed for many decades, and a judicial decision to forbid the independent
agency form would wreak a kind of havoc-raising constitutional doubts
about the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Com-
mission, the Federal Reserve Board, the National Labor Relations Board,
and many other established institutions. There is no sufficiently persuasive
reason to reject the Burkean suggestion that courts should not lightly unset-
tle existing arrangements, long accepted by both Congress and the
President.
The use of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is harder.
Of course the Burkean minimalist knows what to do, which is to uphold the
Pledge in the current form in which it has existed for many decades. The
problem, emphasized by rationalist minimalists and by perfectionists, is that
millions of Americans do not believe in God-and their own convictions are
rejected in the national pledge to the country that they love. Perhaps the Es-
tablishment Clause should be construed to require principle of neutrality
that would forbid government from taking this kind of stand in its national
pledge. On balance, however, the better view seems to be that courts should
permit the long-standing practice on the ground that the Pledge is not a reli-
gious ceremony, that no one is required to speak the words, and that the
mere use of the term ("under God") is not so sectarian as to justify invalida-
tion. With respect to a practice that is so ingrained, it is probably best to say:
De minimis non curat lex.
As I have suggested, the question of foreign surveillance cannot be re-
solved without carefully parsing the relevant statutes. It would be possible
for Burkeans to say that if the president has long engaged in this practice,
and if courts have long permitted him to do so, he can continue unless Con-
gress has clearly said otherwise. If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
clearly says otherwise, then the long-standing tradition should yield unless
the Constitution is best read to give the president surveillance authority that
is at once inherent and exclusive; and it is not easy to read the document, or
the relevant traditions, to confer that authority. 1
290. On adaptive preferences, see JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 256-58 (1997); Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification
Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1119 (2006); and Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969
(2006).
291. See Sunstein, supra note 46.
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These brief comments do not, however, provide anything like a full ex-
planation of how to distinguish among the domains for which Burkean
minimalism is and is not well-suited. Here too much more work remains to
be done.
3. Burke and shallowness. Throughout I have treated Burkean minimal-
ism as if it were committed to shallowness. In one sense this is obviously
true: Burkeans distrust theoretical ambition, and they hope for rulings that
avoid abstract commitments or theoretical positions of any kind. But once
we give an account of Burkeanism, it is not so clear that depth can be
avoided. If Burkeanism is treated as a heuristic for some other value-say,
utilitarianism-then it stands or falls with that value. I have suggested the
possibility of incompletely theorized agreements on behalf of Burkeanism,
but it is not clear how incomplete the theorization will turn out to be. Those
who stress traditions will have to reject certain commitments, that is, those
that are incompatible with the relevant traditions.
For those who link Burkeanism and shallowness, there is an even more
troublesome point. An understanding of Burkeanism might, in the end, re-
quire an account that is not so shallow after all. As I have presented it here,
Burkeanism is most plausible if it is emphasized that traditions often reflect
the independent judgments of many agents, and hence embody their dis-
persed wisdom or at least a good deal of sense. But once Burkeanism is
understood and defended in these terms, it might appear at once deep and
contentious-and thus prove unable to avoid dispute at the theoretical level.
At that stage, the most that the Burkean might say is that if a practice em-
bodies the judgments of diverse people, it is likely to be good, whatever our
criteria for deciding what goodness entails. Perhaps that claim is enough to
produce an agreement among those with competing theoretical accounts, or
with a degree of confusion about the appropriate account.
CONCLUSION
One of my main goals here has been to offer a pragmatic understanding
of Burkeanism, one that opposes each person's "private stock of wisdom" to
the judgments embodied in long-standing practices. On this approach,
Burkeanism is not best defended on the (unhelpfully platitudinous) ground
that societies are constituted by their past, or on the (implausibly mystical)
ground that the past has authority over the present. Burkeanism is best de-
fended on the ground that those who follow entrenched practices, or who
attempt humbly to build on them, will do much better than those who aban-
don traditions or evaluate them by reference to an abstract theory. And on
this view, the apparent sentimentality of Burke's account, and his highly
292
emotional writing, might themselves be understood in pragmatic terms. A
292. I do not contend that Burke was self-consciously attempting this strategy. Note as well
that the Burkean argument for deference to tradition depends on the assumption that many people
have contributed to that tradition. If foreign surveillance has been a secret practice, not known
widely even in Congress, then it stands on less firm ground than do (for example) independent regu-
latory commissions. (Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for pressing this point.)
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sentimental or emotional attachment to traditions may be the best or perhaps
the only way to prevent people from relying on their private stock of wis-
dom-especially in view of the risk that passions can be much stirred by
those who attack traditions.
I have also attempted to show that Burkean minimalism offers a distinc-
tive approach to constitutional law. Like other minimalists, Burkeans value
narrow, incompletely theorized rulings and thus reject both width and depth.
What Burkeans add is an emphasis on the need to develop law with close
reference to established practices and traditions, and a corresponding dis-
trust of judicial judgments that are not firmly rooted in long-standing
experience. In their years on the Supreme Court, Justices Frankfurter and
O'Connor were frequently drawn to Burkean minimalism. Of course there
are big differences between the two. Most notably, Justice Frankfurter sat
during the early stages of the Warren Court, many of whose initiatives he
attempted to resist; Justice O'Connor sat in the aftermath of the Warren
Court, many of whose initiatives she attempted to preserve. Committed
Burkeans, especially those with democratic sympathies, 93 might plausibly
endorse Justice Frankfurter's efforts at resistance while questioning Justice
O'Connor's efforts at preservation.
It is also reasonable to accept one half of Burkean minimalism-to resist
theoretical ambition and in that sense to accept shallowness, while also in-
sisting that rule-bound judgments often make a great deal of sense. 94 It is
certainly possible to endorse a Burkean conception of the judicial role while
rejecting a Burkean approach to politics in general. This position might be
defended on the ground that while Burkeanism is a helpful way of disciplin-
ing judges, citizens require no such discipline, and do not benefit from it.
Jefferson, Pascal, and Bentham might be enlisted on behalf of this view;
recall the suggestion that current generations are the ancients, because they
have the most experience.
One of my major claims has been that no theory of constitutional inter-
pretation makes sense in every imaginable context. While the most
committed Burkeans will favor their method in all domains, I have con-
tended that the argument for Burkean minimalism is much stronger in some
areas than in others. It has least force in cases involving official discrimina-
tion, where traditions are unreliable, and far more appeal in the area of
separation of powers, where sensible practices are likely to have evolved
over time. But the central point is much broader. Where originalism would
produce unacceptable consequences, where traditions and long-standing
practices deserve respect, and where there is reason to distrust the theory-
building capacities of federal judges, Burkean minimalism has a legitimate
and enduring claim on our attention.
293. Recall the difference between thoroughgoing Burkeans, who value traditions as such,
and Democratic Burkeans, who emphasize the role of Burkeanism in constitutional law without
insisting on Burkeanism for the political process. See text accompanying notes 120-122.
294. Whether it does so depends on the set of considerations that lie behind the debate over
rules and standards. See Kaplow, supra note 58.
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